



Home Office

Country Policy and Information Note

Libya: Security and humanitarian situation

Version 2

January 2017

Preface

This note provides country of origin information (COI) and policy guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This may include whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.

Country Information

The COI within this note has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the [Common EU \[European Union\] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information \(COI\)](#), dated April 2008, and the [European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology](#), dated July 2012.

Feedback

Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email [the Country Policy and Information Team](#).

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at:

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Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/>

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Guidance

Updated: 27 January 2017

1. Introduction

1.1 Basis of claim

- 1.1.1 That the general humanitarian situation in Libya is so severe that a person is at real risk of serious harm as defined in Article 15 of the European Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2014 (the Qualification Directive); and/or
- 1.1.2 That the general security situation in Libya presents a real risk of serious harm as defined in Article 15 of the European Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2014 (the Qualification Directive).
- 1.1.3 For further information on “serious harm” see [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).

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2. Consideration of issues

2.1 Credibility

- 2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, the [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).
- 2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the [Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants](#)).
- 2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the [Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis](#)).

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2.2 Exclusion

- 2.2.1 Parties on all sides of the conflict have reportedly been responsible for numerous serious human rights abuses (see [Targeted violence](#) and [Security situation - general](#)). If there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been involved in such activities then decision makers must consider whether one of the exclusion clauses is applicable.
- 2.2.2 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses and restricted leave, see the [Asylum Instruction on Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention](#) and the [Asylum Instruction on Restricted Leave](#).

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2.3 Assessment of risk

i. Refugee convention

- 2.3.1 Where a person would be at risk of serious harm on return due to direct or targeted actions by the parties to the conflict, it may be because of a Refugee-

Convention-defined reason. For more guidance on specific claim types, see: [Libya: Country Policy & Information Notes](#)

- 2.3.2 It is only if the person does not qualify under the Refugee Convention that decision makers need to make an assessment of the need for Humanitarian Protection under Articles 15(a) and (b) of the Qualification Directive and, if that is unsuccessful, under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. See [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).
- 2.3.3 Members of particular IDP communities remain vulnerable to abductions and torture on account of their origin, perceived allegiances during the 2011 conflict, and the current political divide.
- ii. Humanitarian situation
- 2.3.4 Humanitarian conditions in Libya are relevant to whether a person should be granted humanitarian protection on the grounds that to return them would breach their rights under 15 of the Qualification Directive.
- 2.3.5 Humanitarian conditions in Libya have continued to deteriorate since the fall of former President Gaddafi in 2011. There has been extensive damage to civilian homes and public infrastructure, including health, education, roads and administrative facilities, severely disrupting basic services including the provision of safe drinking water, gas and electricity. (See: [Political situation](#) and [Humanitarian situation](#)).
- 2.3.6 Conflict has impacted all the major towns and cities, with the majority of the population affected to some degree by lack of essential resources, including medical care. The healthcare system has deteriorated, with over 40% of health facilities no longer functioning as a result of the ongoing conflict, as well as a lack of medical personnel and limited electricity. This has led to an increase in serious illness and disease. Around 1.9 million people in Libya out of a population of around 6 and a half million require humanitarian aid to meet their basic healthcare needs, with particular concerns in Benghazi, Tripoli, Derna, Sirte, Al Jifarah, Al Kufra, Wadi Al Hayat and Ghat (See [Humanitarian situation](#)).
- 2.3.7 As of August 2016, there were approximately 360,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Libya, a reduction from the estimated 425,000 earlier in 2016 largely as a result of an improvement in the security situation around Benghazi and Sirte, although many internally displaced persons (IDPs) continue to originate from Benghazi as well as Sirte. Living conditions for many IDP families remain poor and often unsafe. (See [Humanitarian situation](#), [Internal displacement](#)).
- 2.3.8 Vulnerable groups include the displaced (particularly children, the elderly, women and those with low economic means) female headed households, persons with disabilities and the chronically ill. Geographically, IDPs and displaced communities are found mainly in the south and east, and in Tawergha. (See [Humanitarian situation](#)).
- 2.3.9 In September 2016, there were estimated to be 1.28 million people at risk of food insecurity. The majority of cases are reported to be in the south and east of the country. Almost half the population is in need of humanitarian assistance. In January 2016 an estimated 21% of Libyan children aged

between 6 and 59 months were suffering from chronic malnutrition. Humanitarian assistance is being provided by a number of agencies, including UNOCHA, the European Commission, UNICEF and others. See [Humanitarian situation](#)).

2.3.10 In general, although conditions in Libya are poor, they do not reach the threshold that would make removal a breach of Article 15 of the Qualification Directive. However, the humanitarian situation is variable across the country. Members of vulnerable groups, particularly where humanitarian conditions are poor and humanitarian aid is less accessible, are at greater risk of serious harm.

2.3.11 Decision makers should consider the individual circumstances of each person (see [Humanitarian situation](#)). Each case must be considered on its facts and the onus is on the person to show that they would face a real risk of serious harm that would make removal a breach of Article 15 of the Qualification Directive.

2.3.12 For guidance on consideration of Article 3 ECHR see [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).

iii. **Security situation**

2.3.13 Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person as a result of indiscriminate violence) applies only to civilians, who must be genuine non-combatants and not those who are party to the conflict. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

2.3.14 In the country guidance case of [FA \(Libya: art 15\(c\)\) Libya CG \[2016\] UKUT 00413 \(IAC\)](#) (7 September 2016) (hearing date 22 August 2016) the Upper Tribunal replaced the previous country guidance case on Article 15 (c) of AT and Others, which held there was no general Article 15(c) risk in Libya, in the light of changing country conditions, including such factors as a lack of direct flights to Libya from the UK, the ebb and flow of fighting, and the rise of Daesh (para 11). The Tribunal held that 'the question of whether a person is at article 15(c) risk in Libya should, until further Country Guidance, be determined on the basis of the individual evidence in the case (para 1).

2.3.15 The situation in Libya is changing constantly so decision makers should consider the most up to date evidence. During 2016 multiple armed conflicts involving some 1,700 armed groups and militias contributed further to a breakdown of law and order. All parties to the conflicts have continued to commit violations of international humanitarian law, and abuses of human rights. Warring factions have caused multiple civilian deaths and injuries, and civilians comprised a high proportion of casualties from the use of explosive weapons in some populated areas.

2.3.16 The violence has also caused large numbers of people to be displaced, particular those from Benghazi and Sirte; however many of these are returning home as Daesh continues to lose territory and control from their previous strongholds. (See [Security situation – general](#) and [Internal Displacement](#)).

- 2.3.17 During 2016, the majority of civilian deaths have been caused by vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, air strikes and gun shot wounds. There are no exact data on the number of civilian casualties across the country but one source, Libya Body Count, estimated that there were over 1,300 deaths (of both combatants and civilians) up to 9 October in 2016. UNSMIL reported scores of civilian casualties in the first 10 months of 2016. UNSMIL recorded a total of 102 civilian casualties across the country, including 29 deaths and 73 injured during October 2016. There were 14 civilian casualties in September 2016, including 7 deaths and four serious injuries. Casualty figures were not broken down into regions or cities.
- 2.3.18 In relative terms, 1,500 deaths represents around 0.025% of the overall population. This does not indicate that a general risk exists in Libya as a whole that simply by being there a civilian is at a real risk of serious and individual threat to their life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence. (See [Security situation – general](#), [Nature of the violence](#) and [Statistics](#); and [Demography](#)).
- 2.3.19 The security situation varies from region to region, and between and within towns and cities. The cities of Benghazi, Surt (aka Sirte), Sabha, Kufrah, Darnha (aka Derna) and Misrata are most violent both in absolute numbers and relative to their populations and, as a result, have experienced the highest levels of internal displacement. Fighting with light and heavy weaponry, abductions, assassinations, public executions, explosions and other abuses have all been reported in these cities. Sirte was the stronghold of Daesh in Libya since late 2014 however the group's control of the city has ended due to military action by an alliance of forces. Other areas of the country, including Tripoli and Tobruk, are less violent which is also reflected in lower levels of reported displacement (See [Security situation – general](#), [Statistics](#); [Security situation by region](#); and [Humanitarian situation](#)).
- 2.3.20 The security situation in Libya, while volatile and fragile has not deteriorated to the extent that in general levels of violence are such that a person would, solely by being present there, face a real risk which threatens his or her life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence (See [Nature of the violence](#) and [Security situation by region](#)).
- 2.3.21 Even where there is no general Article 15(c) risk, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person's individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk. Such factors might include – but are not limited to - the person's age, gender and health.
- 2.3.22 Decision makers must also consider carefully whether the existence of such factors means that the harm they fear is not in fact indiscriminate, but targeted, if not at them personally, at a Refugee Convention defined group to which they belong. If this is the case, decision makers should reconsider whether the person may qualify as a refugee.
- 2.3.23 For guidance on consideration of Article 15(c) including enhanced risk factors see [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#), and further guidance on assessing risk see [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

2.4 Internal relocation

- 2.4.1 Travel within Libya is hampered by violence and on-going conflict between various armed militias and pro-government troops in most of the populated parts of the country. This is compounded by road blocks and control points manned by conflicting militias, including Daesh and other terrorist groups. The south of the country is subject to checkpoints and roadblocks operated by the Government and by militias. Large parts of the country are primarily desert areas with few towns or inhabitants. There is a lack of essential infrastructure and supplies, including fuel and transport.
- 2.4.2 The 2011 constitutional declaration guarantees freedom of movement, but violence has disrupted normal activity in major cities. Airports in Benghazi, Tripoli, Sabha, and Misrata have been attacked and destroyed, severely limiting access to air travel. Airports are particularly vulnerable to attack by militia groups. Tripoli International Airport has been closed since 13 July 2014. (see [Freedom of Movement](#)).
- 2.4.3 Vulnerable groups include the displaced (particularly children, the elderly, women and those with low economic means, female headed households, persons with disabilities and the chronically ill. The displaced are particularly vulnerable due to their loss of income, assets and security.
- 2.4.4 Return to an area that is not the person's home area may be reasonable in some cases. Decision makers must give careful consideration to the relevance and reasonableness of internal relocation on a case-by-case basis taking full account of the individual circumstances of the particular person, including where they originate from in Libya and where they will be returning to, and the latest available country information (see [Security situation – general](#), [Freedom of movement](#), and [country information and guidance on women](#)).
- 2.4.5 Internal relocation is generally possible and reasonable for most people. Where the person claims it is not, the onus is on the person to show why it is not.
- 2.4.6 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and the factors to be taken into account see the [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

2.5 Certification

- 2.5.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
- 2.5.2 For further guidance on certification, see the [Appeals Instruction on Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 \(clearly unfounded claims\)](#).

3. Policy summary

- 3.1.1 Since 2014, conflict between multiple combatants has led to deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation.
- 3.1.2 The country conditions are constantly changing so case workers must consider the most up to date information.
- 3.1.3 The humanitarian situation in Libya is poor, with roughly a third of the population in need of food or other humanitarian support. Humanitarian conditions in some parts of the east and south of the country are the worst affected in terms of vital supplies and healthcare.
- 3.1.4 However, in general, the humanitarian conditions are not at such a level as to make return a breach of Article 15 of the Qualification Directive but may do so in relation to some persons, particularly vulnerable people, e.g. displaced, female-headed households, children, persons with disabilities and the chronically ill.
- 3.1.5 In general the security situation across Libya is not such that a person would, solely by being present there, face a real risk which threatens his or her life by reason of indiscriminate violence. There may be particular factors relating to the individual's circumstances that nevertheless place them at risk. Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits.
- 3.1.6 Internal relocation may be possible, depending on the particular individual circumstances of the person.
- 3.1.7 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

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Country Information

Updated: 27 January 2017

4. Civil war of 2011 and subsequent events

4.1.1 The BBC News Libya country profile page states:

'The National Transitional Council (NTC), a rebel leadership council which had fought to oust the Gaddafi government, declared Libya "liberated" in October 2011 and took over the running of the country... However, it struggled to impose order on the many armed militia that had become active in the months leading up to the ouster of Gaddafi... In August 2012 the NTC handed power to the General National Congress (GNC), an elected parliament which went on to select an interim head of state. Voters chose a new parliament to replace the GNC in June 2014 - the Council of Representatives (CoR), which relocated to the eastern city of Tobruk, leaving Tripoli controlled by powerful militia groups...

'The Islamic State extremist militia took advantage of the conflict between forces loyal to the outgoing GNC and the new parliament to gain control of several coastal cities, including Derna and Sirte. Late in 2015, the UN brokered an agreement to form a new "unity" government - the Presidency Council, headed by unity Prime Minister Fayeza Sarraj - but both Tripoli and Tobruk administrations were reluctant to acknowledge its authority.

'Mr Sarraj and some of his deputies finally arrived in Tripoli in March 2016 and set up their headquarters in a heavily-guarded naval base.'¹

4.1.2 The BBC News website reported on 15 February 2016, that:

'Libya's internationally-backed presidency council has proposed a new cabinet for the country which has had two competing governments since 2014. The proposed council will be put to a vote in parliament this week. The BBC's North Africa correspondent, Rana Jawad says Western powers hope that this will be Libya's future unity government. The existence of two competing governments and the lack of stability have allowed militants and so-called Islamic State to operate...

'Our correspondent says one member of the presidency council, which includes Libya's future prime minister, urged the parliament to endorse the new line-up, saying it would provide the framework to fight terrorism. But divisions have emerged within the presidency council, and two of the nine-member council have not signed up to the latest proposal. In addition, two of the 18 nominated ministers have declined the offer...

'The presidency council's first proposal in January was rejected for being too big and was marred by divisions over who would occupy senior security posts. Libya's presidency council was formed with the signing of an UN-brokered

¹ BBC News: 'Libya – Country Profile' – last updated 20 April 2016
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13754897> Date accessed 3 May 2016

political agreement in December. Its members are still working outside of Libya because rival factions in the capital, Tripoli, and their militia backers, are still opposed to the political agreement.²

- 4.1.3 On 9 June 2016, the UN Security Council affirmed its support for the government of Mr Sarraj in Tripoli, and extended the UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya) remit until 15 December 2016.³ On 12 December 2016, this was further extended until 15 September 2017 in Security Resolution S/2016/1048.⁴

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5. Demography

- 5.1.1 The CIA World Fact-book (updated on 19 April 2016) reported that the population of Libya was estimated to be 6,541,948 with Tripoli, the capital, having 1.126 million people in 2015.⁵
- 5.1.2 Jane's suggested different population figures, and noted the population (which it estimated to be around 5 million) distribution:
- '... between the three main geographical regions is about 60% (3.3 million) in Tripolitania (west coast), 30% (1.5 million) in Cyrenaica (east coast), and 10% (600,000) in the desert interior. In coastal Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the population density is more than 50 per sq km; in the desert it is less than one person per sq km.
- 'The most populous cities of Libya are Tripoli (with around 1.68 million inhabitants), Benghazi (over 650,000), Khoms (up to 200,000) and Misratah (650,000). Urban migration is of serious concern to the Libyan authorities. The urbanised proportion of the population is estimated to be 84%.⁶
- 5.1.3 See also map of population density of June 2015 (based on population estimates in 2010): <http://reliefweb.int/map/libya/libya-population-and-population-density-5-jun-2015>
- 5.1.4 The large majority of the country's population live in the coastal cities and towns. See the following links for useful maps:
- UN Map of Libya:
<http://www.un.org/depts/Cartographic/map/profile/libya.pdf>

² BBC News Libya: 'New Libya cabinet proposed to replace dual governments' published 15 February 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35577299> Date accessed 16 February 2016

³ UN Security Council: Resolution S/2016/528 published 9 June 2016
[http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/Res_2291_\(E\).pdf](http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/Res_2291_(E).pdf)

⁴ United Nations Security Council 2323 'draft Resolution' published 12 December 2016
<https://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/N1623079.pdf> Date accessed 26 January 2017

⁵ The CIA World Factbook: Libya: page last updated 20 September 2016
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html> Date accessed 29 September 2016

⁶ Janes (subscription only), Sentinel Risk Assessment, Libya, Demography, updated August 2015,
<https://janes.ihs.com/NorthAfrica/Display/1303731>, Date accessed on 18 May 2016

- Map of population and population density:
<http://reliefweb.int/map/libya/libya-population-and-population-density-5-jun-2015>
- Reliefweb – maps and infographics:
<http://reliefweb.int/country/lby/thumb#content>

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6. Political situation

6.1.1 Human Rights Watch reported in January 2016:

‘Libya remains without a permanent constitution. The Constitution Drafting Assembly, elected in February 2014 to draft a new constitution, hampered by political infighting and a boycott by Amazigh groups⁷, published a first draft in September 2015. Some political groups called for re-adopting the 1951 Constitution of the Libyan monarchy. The HoR [House of Representatives] failed to amend the counter-terrorism law that it adopted in September 2014, although several provisions could be used to curtail free speech and rights to peaceful assembly and movement. The law prescribes harsh punishments for vaguely defined acts “that harm national unity,” includes an overly broad definition of “terrorist acts,” and stipulates life imprisonment for establishing or leading a “terrorist organization” and 10 years with hard labour for joining a “terrorist organization,” without requiring any evidence of violence...⁸

6.1.2 In February 2016 the BBC reported ‘The elected and internationally-recognised government has only tenuous control over the eastern region of Cyrenaica where its fledgling, badly equipped and poorly trained army is battling jihadist militias in Libya’s second city of Benghazi and other key towns. Its authority is challenged by an Islamist-led administration installed by a parliament whose mandate has long run out but which is in control of the capital, Tripoli. Some elements of the two rival groups have signed up to a United Nations-sponsored power-sharing deal but others remain opposed and peace remains elusive. It is the militias operating across the country, thought to number nearly 2,000, who are really calling the shots. Most recently, fighters from the so-called Islamic State (IS) have established a stronghold in the central coastal city of Sirte, and have advanced towards nearby oil sites in Sidra and Ras Lanuf, an attractive source of revenue for the militant group.⁹

6.1.3 In its June 2016 report, the Centre for Security Studies at ETH Zurich stated: ‘While the conflict has often been characterized as primarily one between Islamists and their opponents, it is considerably more complex. To be sure,

⁷ ‘The Amazigh, (Berber): the indigenous non-Arab population of North Africa, and their language’ undated report, <http://phoenicia.org/berber.html> Date accessed 27 January 2017

⁸ Human Rights Watch: World Report 2015, Libya <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/libya> Date accessed 17 November 2016

⁹ BBC News: ‘Guide to key Libyan militias’ updated 11 January 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19744533> Date accessed 24 November 2016

ideology has been a mobilizing factor. However, the conflict has been driven by the competing interests of local groups that have been able to deploy violence for political gain and control over resources. The new GNA [Government of National Accord] will need to reconcile these competing groups as it lays the foundations of new governance structures and stronger state institutions, particularly in the security sector. International support aimed at assisting Libyan authorities in degrading the IS – or, more generally, in stabilizing the country – must be harmonized with the GNA's efforts to increase its support base and to build sustainable political and state structures.¹⁰

6.1.4 The Security Council Report (September 2016 monthly forecast) stated:

'Since the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in December 2015 by participants in the UN-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue, the failure of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives to endorse the Government of National Accord (GNA) has critically hampered the political situation. On 22 August [2016], the House rejected a cabinet list submitted on 15 February by the Presidency Council of the GNA. The House, reportedly in full quorum, also asked the Presidency Council to submit a new consensual list of proposed ministers. This requires agreement by all nine members of the Presidency Council, including two who boycotted it asserting that it is insufficiently inclusive. One of them, Omar al-Aswad, announced on 26 August his intention to re-join the Presidency Council...

'Five months since its arrival in Tripoli, the Presidency Council has faced numerous challenges in the performance of its duties. On 16-18 July, the members of the Libyan Political Dialogue discussed with the Presidency Council the difficulties it was facing. At the meeting, participants identified several areas where progress by the Presidency Council was crucial: delivery of basic services, implementation of security arrangements stipulated by the LPA, resumption of production and export of oil and bringing on board its two boycotting members... By the time of the House vote, attempts to restore oil production (through reaching an agreement with the armed group known as Petroleum Facilities Guard) and take control of sovereign funds (by appointing a steering committee to run the Libyan Investment Authority) had sparked controversies and yielded limited results.'¹¹

6.1.5 The UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office stated in September 2016:

'The Libya Political Agreement was signed by a majority of the Libyan negotiating parties at a ceremony in Skhirat, Morocco on 17 December 2015, paving the way for a new unified Government of National Accord (GNA). On the whole reaction to the arrival of the GNA's Presidency Council in the capital of Libya on 30 March [2016] has been positive and the GNA are supported by

¹⁰ Centre for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. Dr. Lisa Watanabe: Libya: in the eye of the Storm NO. 193, June 2016 <http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:49421/eth-49421-01.pdf> Date accessed 24 November 2016

¹¹ Libya: Security Council Report: September 2016 Monthly Forecast published 1 September 2016 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-09/libya_25.php Date accessed 24 November 2016

the majority of Libyans. But the security situation remains dangerous and unpredictable as the GNA works to restore stability and security to Libya. Full scale military operations involving small arms, tanks, artillery and aircraft are ongoing in several areas...¹²

- 6.1.6 According to a policy memo published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, Libya is in a politically fragile state. It stated:

'Libya is at a dangerous turning point. The post-Muammar Gaddafi transition has divided the country between three rival governments and dozens of armed groups. Once one of Africa's wealthiest nations, Libya is now bleeding cash, in desperate need of humanitarian aid, and threatened by Islamic State (ISIS)...'¹³

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7. Protagonists

7.1 Overview

- 7.1.1 A report published in September 2015 by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) noted the fragmented nature of the conflict:

'The two main Libyan political factions that emerged post-revolution, the GNC and the HoR, are often described as "Islamists" and "liberals" respectively. The former is largely represented today by the so-called Tripoli Government, based in the west of the country, while the latter is largely represented by the internationally recognized Tobruk Government led by the HoR, based in the east. The conflict is mainly between two fighting blocs: the GNC-aligned Libya Dawn and the HoR-aligned Dignity. However, much of the conflict, and Libya itself, is fragmented into localized battles and power dynamics, driven by loyalties along often-overlapping ideological, regional, local, tribal and ethnic lines...

'An estimated 1,700 armed groups and militias are active in Libya, some of which were formed as brigades during the 2011 uprising, while others were formed in the later stages or aftermath of the 2011 conflict. This fragmentation challenges the formation of a national consensus or shared vision among Libyans on how to address the legacy of their history, manage the transition or share power thereafter. Chaos across the country has also provided fertile ground for the development of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and affiliated groups. ISIL's territorial influence has grown considerably in 2015.'¹⁴

¹² UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Libya Advice: Safety & Security – last updated 21 September 2016 <https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/libya/safety-and-security> Date accessed 29 September 2016

¹³ European Council on Foreign Relations: Policy Memo – 'Intervening better: Europe's second chance in Libya' by Mattia Toaldo published 13 May 2016 http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR172_-_INTERVENING_BETTER_-_EUROPES_SECOND_CHANCE_IN_LIBYA_2.pdf Date accessed 13 October 2016

¹⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 'Shattered lives: Civilians suffer

7.1.2 The UN OHCHR report of 15 February 2016 summarised the various factions fighting in Libya:

'Libya does not have a straightforward delineation of State security forces and opposition forces. Instead, it has a complex set of armed actors, with varying degrees of association with the State and each other. The current security arrangements need to be understood against the background of the security apparatus in place in Libya in previous years. The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya described an "amorphous" system in which Government forces involved "different structures operating in different capacities at different times and at different places". Power and operational commands shifted according to the directions given by Gaddafi and his cohorts to a variety of structures (such as the armed forces, Kata'eb/battalions, revolutionary committees and the revolutionary guard)...

'During 2011, a loose coalition of brigades rose up against the Gaddafi forces, with the coalition significantly strengthened by defecting members from the Gaddafi forces. At the end of 2011, with the unilateral victory declaration by opposition forces, a large number of "revolutionary" armed groups (the armed groups that had fought against Gaddafi) organised along geographical and tribal lines, were effectively in control of large parts of the Libyan territory. The formal structures of the Libyan Army and Police were fractured...

'In November 2015, UNSMIL/OHCHR reported that armed groups had proliferated, consolidating "effective control over large swaths of territory, strategic installations and State institutions". It is apparent that armed groups are divided along various lines, such as tribal, or ideological, or by geographic affiliation. Some armed groups pursue specific political agendas, others operate as local security, while others might be characterised as being focused on criminal enterprises. Armed groups have themselves fractured, and allegiances and alliances between groups have shifted in the course of 2014 and 2015. Many armed groups are part of or act in support of either Operation Dignity or Libya Dawn...' ¹⁵

7.1.3 The Centre for Security Studies at ETH Zurich (CSS) reported:

'The Dawn coalition includes the Misratan militias, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, former members of the once al-Qaida-affiliated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group who are now politicians and leaders of militias, as well as Berber tribes. In the Dignity camp are those who oppose Islamists, not so much due to ideology as out of mistrust about their intentions with regards to purging politics and the public sphere of remnants of the old regime. It comprises elements of the Gaddafi-era armed forces, the Zintani militias, and eastern Libyan tribes in favour of federalism. The divisions are thus local –

from the use of explosive weapons in Libya', September 2015, (Main parties to the conflict p. 13) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5629e1744.html> Date accessed 23 February 2016

¹⁵ United Nations Human Rights Council: 'Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings' published 15 February 2016 (IV. Armed actors in Libya paragraphs 50-54) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html> Date accessed 9 March 2016

connected to the interests of powerful localities and tribal communities – as well as, to a lesser extent, regional and ethnic. At first glance, these two loose coalitions appear to reflect ideological divisions. However, the conflict is driven more by interests and competition for relative power and resources than by ideology.’¹⁶

7.1.4 In its 4 November 2016 report International Crisis Group commented:

‘The December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, signed in Skhirat, Morocco, has reconfigured more than contributed to resolving internal strife. A year ago, the conflict was between rival parliaments and their associated governments; today it is mainly between accord supporters and opponents, each with defectors from the original camps and heavily armed. The accord’s roadmap, the idea that a caretaker government accommodating the two parliaments and their allies could establish a new political order and reintegrate militias, can no longer be implemented without change. New negotiations involving especially key security actors not at Skhirat are needed to give a unity government more balanced underpinning...

‘Skhirat sought to resolve the dispute between the House of Representatives (HoR) and its associated government, based respectively in the eastern cities of Tobruk and al-Bayda, and the General National Congress (GNC) and its government in Tripoli. It created a Presidency Council, a rump executive that took office in Tripoli in March 2016 and was tasked to form a unity government, and an advisory High State Council of ex-GNC members. The HoR was to continue as the sole parliament and approve the unity government, but it has yet to do so...’¹⁷

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7.2 Libyan Regular Army

7.2.1 The status of the original Libyan army (the Libyan Regular Army) has changed since 2011, and more so since the establishment of two separate governments in the country. The Netherlands report (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation) on the security situation in Libya stated:

‘Marginalised under Gaddafi, who favoured his own special elite forces; the regular army is undergoing a reconstruction phase and lacks equipment, arms and military expertise. Its 35,000 soldiers are underpaid. According to the Prime Minister, militias are better armed than regular army units. The main army units comprise of the Special Forces known as al-Sa’iqa. They were deployed to Benghazi in 2013 where they managed to curb the killings and abductions, which gave them a certain degree of popular support...

‘Al-Sa’iqa, which in theory is answerable to the Ministry of Defence, has sided with former general Haftar’s forces in Benghazi against Islamist forces. With

¹⁶ Centre for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. Dr. Lisa Watanabe ‘Libya: in the eye of the Storm’ NO. 193, June 2016 <http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:49421/eth-49421-01.pdf> Date accessed 24 November 2016

¹⁷ International Crisis Group: The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset, 4 November 2016 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libyan-political-agreement-time-reset> Date accessed 24 November 2016

the appointment by the Tubruq House of Representatives of an Operation Dignity officer as the army's new Chief of Staff, the forces allied with former general Haftar seem to have been integrated into the regular army, which is operating nominally under the authority of the Tubruq government. However, the official status of the regular army and its relations with former general Haftar's troops remain unclear. In fact, the government in Tubruq has little power and few means to control a national army.'¹⁸

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7.3 Libyan National Army (also known as Operation Dignity)

7.3.1 The Netherlands report on security in Libya (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation) stated:

'Retired general Khalifa Bilqasim Haftar arrived on the conflict scene in mid-May 2014. With his own forces, operating under the name Libyan National Army (LNA), he launched Operation Dignity (Amaliyyat al-Karama) to oust Islamist groups from Benghazi. Regular army units (the al-Sa'iqa Special Forces and the air force units based at Tubruq and Banina (Benghazi)) soon joined his cause, as well as influential local tribes (the Ubaydat, Awaqir and Baraghitha), the Barqa Army (Jaysh Barqa or the Cyrenaica Defence Force), Toubou fighters from Kufra and Tuareg from Ubari. In western Libya, Operation Dignity enjoys the support of the Zintan militias, the head of the military police and the militia of the Warshafana tribe...

'Haftar's Libyan National Army has since May 2014 carried out a number of major military offensives in Benghazi against the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, an alliance of Islamist and jihadi groups. In the end of August 2014, the LNA declared that it would take orders from the regular army's new Chief of Staff while maintaining a degree of autonomy. The reintegration of former general Haftar within the regular army seems to confirm this alliance even though the relationship between the regular army and Operation Dignity remains unclear.'¹⁹

7.3.2 The UNOHCHR report of 15 February 2016 stated that:

'The Libyan National Army has been further fragmented by the events of 2014 and 2015, as is evidenced by the competing appointments and command instructions issued by the House of Representatives and the General National Congress. In 2014, the Congress appointed Major General Abd al-Salam al-Obaidy as Commander of General Staff of the Libyan National Army. Major General al-Obaidy issued a statement ordering all forces of the Libyan National Army to fight against any military force moving towards Benghazi (a reference to Operation Dignity forces) after the launch of Operation Dignity. In August 2014, the House of Representatives appointed Major General Abd al-

¹⁸ The Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation, 19 December 2014, (3.2.1. The Libyan Regular Army p.13) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/54afd82d4.html> Date accessed 24 February 2016

¹⁹ The Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation, 19 December 2014, (3.2.2 Libyan National Army (LNA) / Operation Dignity p.13) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/54afd82d4.html> Date accessed 24 February 2016

Razik al-Nadoory as Commander of General Staff of the Libyan National Army...

'Major General al-Nadoory's first statement announced that Libya Dawn forces and Ansar al-Sharia were terrorists, and that the Libyan National Army supported Operation Dignity. In March 2015, the House of Representatives created a new post in the army and appointed Khalifa Haftar as General Commander and promoted him to the rank of Lieutenant-General. The Tripoli-based authorities and the General National Congress, however, dispute the legitimacy of either this appointment or that of Major General alNadoory, and continue to support Major General al-Obaidy.'²⁰

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7.4 The Zintan Brigades

7.4.1 The BBC News website reported that:

'The Zintan, al-Sawaiq and al-Qaqa brigades are anti-Islamist militias that operate especially in the west of Libya...

'The powerful Zintan militia supports the internationally-recognised authorities and has clashed on numerous occasions with Libya Dawn. It continues to detain Saif-al-Islam al-Gaddafi, the son of the former leader who was sentenced to death in Tripoli last year, in the western city of Zintan, while most other Gaddafi-era officials are held by pro-Islamist forces in Tripoli...

'The al-Qaqa and al-Sawaiq battalions are also pro-official authorities and anti-Islamist. They attacked the GNC in Tripoli soon after Operation Dignity was announced in May 2014.'²¹

7.4.2 The UNOHCHR report of 15 February 2016 stated that 'Amongst the primary armed groups opposed to Libya Dawn are the Zintan-based "Al-Sawa'iq", "Al-Qa'qa'a" and "Al-Madani" Brigades. The coalition also includes the Warshafana-based "Jaysh Al-Qaba'el" armed group, that allegedly includes within its membership some members of the army of the former Qadhafi regime. This coalition is broadly allied with Operation Dignity and General Haftar.'²²

7.5 Ansar al-Sharia/Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries

7.5.1 The BBC News website reported on this group on 13 June 2014. The news report described Ansar al-Sharia as:

²⁰ United Nations Human Rights Council: 'Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings' published 15 February 2016 (IV. Armed actors in Libya paragraphs 55-56)

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html> Date accessed 9 March 2016

²¹ BBC News: 'Guide to key Libyan militias' updated 11 January 2016

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19744533> Date accessed 29 September 2016

²² United Nations Human Rights Council: 'Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings' published 15 February 2016 (IV. Armed actors in Libya paragraph 62)

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html> Date accessed 9 March 2016

'Ansar al-Sharia is an Islamist militia calling for the implementation of strict Sharia law across Libya. The group, whose name means "Partisans of Islamic law" in Arabic, emerged following the February 2011 anti-Gaddafi uprising. It is made up of former rebels from several militias based in eastern Libya, notably the Abu Obayda bin al-Jarah Brigade, the Malik Brigade and the 17 February Brigade...

'The group was officially formed in June 2012 when it issued the "Ansar al-Sharia First Meeting", a communique announcing its inauguration. The number of rebels that fight for the group remains unknown. The group operates mainly in Benghazi and denies having any presence elsewhere in Libya'.²³

7.5.2 The Netherlands report (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation) noted:

'In order to fight Operation Dignity, Ansar al-Sharia allied itself with a number of militias composed of young Islamist revolutionaries supported by local tribes. This alliance is known as the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, and includes groups such as the 17 February Martyrs Brigade, an important Islamist militia (3,500 combatants partially remunerated by the Libyan Ministry of Defence), Libya Shield Unit no. 1, the Raf'allah al-Sahati Brigade, the 319th Infantry Brigade, the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade, the Fakhri al-Sallabi Brigade and the Zintan Martyrs Brigade.'²⁴

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7.6 The Misrata Brigades/Libya Dawn

7.6.1 The December 2014 Netherlands report noted: 'The Misrata Brigades, from a town that was besieged for six months during the 2011 uprising, are composed of 235 powerful militias and enjoy much prestige nationwide.'²⁵

7.6.2 The BBC News website stated:

'Libya Dawn is a grouping of pro-Islamist militias that in summer 2014 attacked Tripoli International Airport and went on to seize large parts of the capital...

'The militia alliance can be viewed as the "armed forces" of the General National Congress (GNC), the former parliament which has been reconvened in Tripoli...

'Libya Dawn, which has acquired military planes, controls virtually all coastal cities, from Misrata to the border with Tunisia as well as cities further south,

²³ BBC News: 'Profile: Libya's Ansar al-Sharia' published 13 June 2014

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27732589> Date accessed 24 February 2016

²⁴ The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation, 19 December 2014, (3.2.3 Ansar al-Sharia/Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries p.14) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/54afd82d4.html> Date accessed 24 February 2016

²⁵ The Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation, 19 December 2014, (3.2.5 The Misrata Brigades/Libya Dawn p.15) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/54afd82d4.html> Date accessed 24 February 2016

including Gharyan, Nalut and Jadu in the mainly Berber mountain range of Nafusa...

'The name Libya Dawn originally referred to the militias' operation to seize Tripoli but soon came to refer to the armed group coming under its umbrella...

'Many of its fighters came from the city of Misrata, but in the last year the powerful militias based in that city appear to have drifted from the Libya Dawn coalition.'²⁶

7.6.3 The UNOHCHR report of 15 February 2016 stated that:

'Among the groups in Libya Dawn are Libya Shield Forces which bring together a variety of revolutionary armed groups who see themselves as "guardians of the revolution". Libya Shield Forces are divided into three main brigades named after their geographical locations: the eastern, central, and western Libya Shields. The western and Misrata-based central Libya Shield forces remained dominant in the Libya Dawn coalition in 2014. They incorporate into their fold, for example, forces from Zleiten, Al-Khoms, Misillata, Tarhouna, Jadu, the Nafusa Mountains (Gheryan, Kikla, Jadu and Nalut) and Al-Zawiya. Armed groups affiliated with Libya Dawn also include the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, Deterrence and Assistance Force, the High Security Committee (Abu Salim Branch), and the Janzour Knights Brigade.'²⁷

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7.7 Toubou, Tuareg and Arab militias

7.7.1 The Netherlands report (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation) noted:

'In the south of the country, influential Arab, Toubou and Tuareg tribes were engaged in local conflicts – for instance in Sabha – which got out of hand to the point that militias from the north had to intervene. The most important militias in Fezzan's capital city are those of the Awlad Sulayman and the Toubou. Other militias are linked to the Qadhadhfa, Warfalla, Hasawna and Mahamid tribes. These militias are controlling security in public buildings and banks, but also in some neighbourhoods. Recurrent fighting between these militias is fuelled by their rivalry for political dominance and access to economic resources.'²⁸

7.7.2 The UNOHCHR report of 15 February 2016 stated that:

²⁶ BBC News: 'Guide to key Libyan militias' updated 11 January 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19744533> Date accessed 24 February 2016

²⁷ United Nations Human Rights Council: 'Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings' date published 15 February 2016 (IV. Armed actors in Libya paragraph 61) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html> Date accessed 9 March 2016

²⁸ The Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Libya: Security Situation, 19 December 2014, (3.3.1 Fighting in Sabha p.15-16) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/54afd82d4.html> Date accessed 24 February 2016

'In Sabha, the major armed conflicts have taken place between Tabu, Al-Qadhadhifa, and Al-Megharba armed groups opposed to the Awlad Suleiman armed group. In Al-Kufra, the conflict has been primarily between the Arab Al-Zwaya and the Tabu armed groups, with the Tabu accusing Al-Zwaya of favouring their own tribe in relation to, for instance, the provision of government services. Several armed clashes have focused on attempts to control strategic locations, such as oil fields or smuggling routes. Some level of alliances exists between tribal armed groups and either Operation Dignity or Libya Dawn, for example, it has been observed that the Tabu are generally aligned with Operation Dignity; while the Tuareg are generally aligned with Libya Dawn.'²⁹

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7.8 Daesh (Islamic State)

7.8.1 The BBC News website reported:

'A major development on the ground in Libya in 2015 was the emergence of IS (Islamic State)...

'IS built on an existing presence in the eastern city of Derna, a long-time jihadist hub, where groups actively pledged allegiance to IS and took over local administration buildings... Although IS was driven out of most areas of Derna in July 2015 it went on to seize "complete control" of the central coastal city of Sirte, the birthplace of former leader Muammar Gaddafi. In June, the group's official radio station, al-Bayan, which is already operating in Syria and Iraq, reportedly began broadcasting from Sirte...

'IS has claimed that it has captured the coastal town of Bin-Jawad, as well as having a "strong presence" in Nofilia, Sidra and Ra's Lanuf, putting it significantly closer to installations in Libya's oil rich region, and leading to repeated clashes with the Petroleum Facilities Guard...

'IS has managed to strike in Tripoli and Benghazi by launching high-profile one-off attacks, for example those targeting embassies and hotels in Tripoli in January and February 2015, and most recently on a police training base in Zliten, near the capital. The group is also present in Benghazi and has cells in Tripoli... IS has divided Libya geographically into three "provinces": Barqah (Cyrenaica) in the east, Tripoli (referring to wider Tripolitania) in the west, and Fezzan in the centre and south...'³⁰

7.8.2 The Jamestown Foundation reported on the rise of Islamic State in Libya in an article published on 1 April 2016 ('Libya's Political Turmoil Allows Islamic State to Thrive). The article stated:

²⁹ United Nations Human Rights Council: 'Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings' published 15 February 2016 (IV. Armed actors in Libya paragraph 63) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html> Date accessed 9 March 2016

³⁰ BBC News: 'Guide to key Libyan militias' updated 11 January 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19744533> Date accessed 24 February 2016

'The Libyan civil conflict has created a political and security vacuum that IS has exploited, carving out strongholds in weakly governed areas such as Sirte and thereby further fueling [sic] instability. Its Syria and Iraq-based leadership (hereafter, IS Central) recognized the potential for growth in Libya early on and poured considerable resources into its Libyan wilayat, dispatching high-level officials to Sirte to manage the group's expansion and eventually redirecting hundreds of foreign fighters from Syria to Libya...

'In turn, Sirte has become a hub for the group's North African operations. IS Central's interest in Sirte underscores the city's growing strategic value to the organization, and illustrates the group's ambitious plans for its Libyan wilayat...

'Libya lacks the sectarian tensions that IS has exploited to mobilize Sunni populations in Syria and Iraq, and as a consequence, IS must depend on foreign fighters, alongside a hardened core of Libyan militants. This has done little to help it win over the local population, which has rebelled against it in both Sirte and in Derna. In the latter, rival jihadist factions, supported by local residents, forced IS fighters to withdraw entirely in June 2015...

'IS is also less powerful than it purports to be in Libya. Even though foreigners have significantly boosted its ranks in the country—recent estimates suggest that there are between 3,000 and 6,500 IS militants in Libya—other armed actors in Libya, including the now-fragmented Libya Dawn coalition and its rival, the Libyan National Army, are far larger and better-equipped.'³¹

7.8.3 At the end of April 2016 the Jamestown Foundation reported that

'Islamic State (IS) appears to have suffered a setback in Libya after they were pushed out from the city of Derna this month (al-Arabiya, April 21). The victory was claimed by both the Libyan military under General Khalifa Haftar and the local "Shura Council of the Mujahideen of Derna and its Outskirts," or SCMD, which released a two and a half minute-long video entitled "The joy of the people after liberation" via its al-Sabeel Media Foundation (North Africa Post, April 22). The film consists of aerial footage of the city, apparently filmed using a drone and overlaid with the sounds of congested traffic.'³²

7.8.4 A correspondent in the Long War Journal wrote that the US Secretary of Defence, Ash Carter, told the US Senate Armed Services Committee the territory of Islamic State in Sirte

'... has been reduced to a single square kilometre ... Carter's testimony was echoed by Al Bunyan Al Marsoos ("Solid Structure") operations room, which

³¹ The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor Volume 14 Issue 7: 'Libya's political turmoil allows Islamic State to thrive' published 1 April 2016
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45269&cHash=c783b403d90a116ae4656b7675943838 Date accessed 27 April 2016

³² Jamestown Foundation, Libya: Islamic State forced out of Derna, 29 April 2016, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 9
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45373&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b21308f2831251226bf6e563b15459d2#.VyoH0YQrKM9 Date accessed 4 May 2016

draws fighters from militias based in Misrata and is allied with Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA). Al Bunyan Al Marsoos launched an offensive against the Islamic State's stronghold in May... "ISIL is now under tremendous pressure there, with its territory in Sirte reduced to a single square kilometer." Carter also described the Islamic State's remaining safe haven in the city as "a single neighbourhood."³³

7.8.5 On 6 December 2016, the BBC reported that ISIL had been ejected from Sirte, stating:

'Libyan forces are hunting down the last Islamic State (IS) jihadists in the city of Sirte, after ousting them from their former bastion. The fighters are said to be "hiding in fewer than 10 houses" in the seafront district of Al-Giza al-Bahriya. The pro-unity government force announced its full control of Sirte on Monday, after the last IS-controlled area fell to the UN-backed fighters.

'However, a spokesman has told the BBC they are not declaring victory yet. The operation's Ahmed Hadia told the BBC: "They've now taken control of the last area, but that does not mean military operations have ended." Mr Hadia said the forces, which have been supported by US air raids, would now focus on "combing the city" to find any remaining IS jihadists.'³⁴

7.8.6 The United Nations Security Council published a report on 18 July 2016, on the threat posed to Libya and neighboring countries by Islamic State/Da'esh and other terrorist groups. It provides an analysis of such groups and their impact.³⁵ Prior to this in May 2016, Human Rights Watch published a report on life under Islamic State in Sirte.³⁶

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8. Generalised violence

8.1.1 Human Rights Watch's 2016 annual report stated that

'Militias and criminal groups throughout Libya continued to abduct and forcibly disappear hundreds of civilians, including civil society activists, politicians, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers with impunity. According to the Libyan Red Crescent, at least 600 people went missing in such circumstances between February 2014 and April 2015. ...

³³ The Long War Journal: 'Islamic State's safe haven in Sirte shrinks to a single neighbourhood' Thomas Joscelyn published 22 September 2016

<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/islamic-states-safe-haven-in-sirte-libya-shrinks-to-a-single-neighborhood.php/feed> Date accessed 20 October 2016

³⁴ BBC News: Libya Conflict – 'IS 'ejected' from stronghold of Sirte' published 6 December 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38227543> Date accessed 27 January 2017

³⁵ United Nations Security Council: 'Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed to Libya and neighbouring countries, including off the coast of Libya, by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities' S/2016/627 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_627.pdf published 18 July 2016 Date accessed 26 January 2017

³⁶ Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 – Libya – published 27 January 2016 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf Date accessed 16 February 2016

'Amid tenuous United Nations-led peace talks, Libya's political and security crisis deepened as two rival governments competed for legitimacy, control of vital institutions, and international support. Despite some factions signing a political deal in December, there was no end in sight to the crisis. As armed clashes continued, the country edged towards a humanitarian crisis, with almost 400,000 people internally displaced and increasing disruption to basic services, such as power and fuel supplies.'

The 15 February 2016 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya stated that 'Armed groups on all sides continued to abduct civilians on the basis of their identity, family or perceived political affiliations. Detainees continued to be held in official and unofficial detention facilities, often denied contact with the outside world or access to judicial authorities.'³⁷

8.1.2 On 27 September 2016, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms Kate Gilmore, addressed the 33rd session of the Human Rights Council Oral update of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya. She noted:

'Warring factions continue to show little regard for civilians –failing to take steps needed to avoid or minimise civilian casualties and protect civilian objects from damage...

'In residential areas across Libya, heavy weaponry has been deployed without ensuring sufficient precautions and this is true of all parties...

'Armed groups act with complete impunity, continuing to abduct, torture and kill civilians on the basis of their perceived or actual family links, origin or political affiliation. In July, for example, 14 bodies were discovered dumped at a Benghazi rubbish tip. It was clear that the victims, some of whom had been abducted by armed groups earlier in the month, had been tortured and then killed. In June, 12 prisoners were released from Tripoli's Al-Ruwaimi prison, in compliance with a court order. But, just 24 hours later, their families confronted the grim task of identifying their bodies. The 12 had been beaten, shot and killed. Those responsible remain unidentified in both instances...

'Human rights defenders and media professionals have also faced abductions and attacks. Thanks to repeated intimidation and attack against their staff, the National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights in Tripoli remains effectively shut down. In March, prominent human rights advocate Abdul Basit Abu-Dahab, was killed in Darna when a bomb placed in his vehicle exploded. Many other human rights defenders have fled the country, curtailed their activities or gone into hiding...

'Civilian objects are not spared. In 2016, homes have been attacked, looted and destroyed, including in Benghazi, Zawiya and most recently in Misallata. From May to July, the Benghazi Medical Centre was shelled on four separate

³⁷ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 25 February 2016, (paragraph 40)
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d697d84.html> Date accessed 4 May 2016

occasions. In June, a car bomb exploded at the entrance of the Al-Jala' Hospital killing five people, and injuring 13 others, including two children.³⁸

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9. Security situation - general

9.1 Nature of the violence

9.1.1 A report published by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) dated 16 November 2015 noted:

'Libya continues to be embroiled in deadly violence and multiple armed conflicts, non-international in character, affecting several regions, and contributing to a general breakdown of law and order. All parties to the conflicts continue to commit violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and abuses of human rights, including indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks; summary executions and other unlawful killings; arbitrary deprivations of liberty; and torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (ill-treatment).'³⁹

9.1.2 The UNSMIL report also referred to the conduct of hostilities, stating:

'Across Libya, warring factions showed little regard for avoiding or minimizing loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. They have used imprecise weaponry in densely-populated residential areas in what often amounted to indiscriminate attacks, leading to civilian fatalities and damage to civilian infrastructure. UNSMIL has also received reports that airstrikes by Operation Dignity, Libya Dawn and in one instance the Egyptian air-force led to civilian casualties and / or damage to civilian infrastructure...

'UNSMIL also documented a number of instances where the neutrality of hospitals and other medical facilities was violated, while medical personnel were caught-up in the violence and subjected to physical assaults, abductions and harassment...

'Bomb attacks, including suicide attacks, have claimed the lives of dozens, including civilians. In one such incident, at least 42 people, including children, were killed on 20 February 2015 in bomb attacks in the town of Qubba, in eastern Libya. Most victims were queuing at the local petrol station, when the attacks took place. Responsibility for the bombings was claimed by a Libyan armed group pledging allegiance to ISIL, allegedly in retaliation for the airstrikes on Derna on 16 February'.⁴⁰

³⁸ UNSMIL – 33rd Session of the Human Rights Council - Address by Ms. Kate Gilmore United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights 27 September 2016 <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5662&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=2099737&language=en-US> Date accessed 30 September 2016

³⁹ United Nations Support Mission in Libya: 'Report on the human rights situation in Libya' published 16 November 2015 (2. Summary p.1) <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5652f3ec4.pdf> Date accessed 2 March 2016

⁴⁰ United Nations Support Mission in Libya: 'Report on the human rights situation in Libya' published 16 November 2015 (6, Key concerns, 6.1. Conduct of hostilities p.8) <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5652f3ec4.pdf> Date accessed 2 March 2016

9.1.3 The UNOHCHR, in their report of 15 February 2016 submitted to the Human Rights Council, stated:

‘OHCHR investigated and obtained credible and consistent reports of indiscriminate attacks impacting on civilians and civilian areas during hostilities in 2014 and 2015. The number of such attacks has been particularly pronounced in the east, specifically in Benghazi, owing to the long term hostilities there. However, a general trend of such attacks is apparent across the cities that have experienced conflict. In some instances, whole neighbourhoods appear to have been targeted, without distinguishing between military and civilian objectives. At other times, misfiring or the use of weaponry unsuited for precise targeting appears to have been the dominant reasons for particular indiscriminate attacks...

‘Heavy weaponry such as Grad rockets and rocket-propelled grenades, which are not appropriate for use in highly populated residential areas given that they cannot be targeted with sufficient precision, have been employed in built-up residential areas, leading to extensive damage of civilian buildings, and death and injury to civilians. Without the ability to conduct site visits and undertake detailed investigations, OHCHR has not been able to determine which parties were responsible for many specific attacks (given that the type of weaponry being referred to, with the exception of air-strikes, is used by most parties). However, it has received reports of indiscriminate attacks in all conflict areas.’⁴¹

9.1.4 The OHCHR report (Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings) did not provide specific numbers of casualties or abuses. However, the report stated:

‘The scope of complaints received highlights the magnitude of ongoing violations and abuses being committed in Libya and the need for further investigations and follow-up.’⁴²

9.1.5 Amnesty International stated on 17 February 2016 that:

‘The scale of abuse is staggering. Forces on all sides have carried out hundreds of abductions, taken hostages, tortured, ill-treated and summarily killed detainees, and launched indiscriminate attacks on residential areas in some cases amounting to war crimes...

‘Forces loyal to IS, have exploited the power vacuum created by the conflict to seize control of areas where they have terrorized the civilian population by enforcing their own interpretation of Islamic Law. They have carried out public lynchings - leaving victims’ corpses on display, as well as public floggings and amputations, and imposed a strict Islamic dress code on women. ...

⁴¹ UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings, p26, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html>, Date accessed on 18 May 2016

⁴² UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings, p26, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html>, Date accessed on 16 November 2016

'Libya's justice system has largely collapsed meaning that widespread abuses have gone completely unpunished. Lawyers, judges, activists and human rights defenders face constant threats and attacks. Amnesty International is not aware of a single militia member who has been prosecuted for human rights abuses since 2011.'⁴³

9.1.6 A UN Security Council report of 25 February 2016 stated in relation to the targeting of civilians:

'In eastern Libya, abductions included opponents of Operation Dignity and individuals accused of terrorism. The fate and whereabouts of those captured by the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, including prisoners taken from Bouhdeima military prison in October 2014, are unknown, and there are serious concerns for their lives and safety...The reporting period saw an increase in criminally motivated kidnappings for ransom, at times targeting children, particularly in western and southern Libya.'⁴⁴

9.1.7 The US Department of State noted: 'Forces aligned with both the government and its opponents were responsible for the disappearance of civilians in conflict areas, although in most cases the details remained obscure. In the eastern region, a campaign of killings, kidnappings, and intimidation continued to target activists, journalists, former government officials, and the security forces. Kidnappings remained a daily occurrence in many cities.'⁴⁵

9.1.8 The UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office stated on their Libya Advice page:

'On 18 September [2016], there were clashes between Petroleum Facilities Guards and the Libyan National Army at the Es Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil facilities in the central oil crescent, after LNA forces had seized the facilities the previous week...

'Heavy fighting continues in residential areas of Benghazi city, and civilians have been killed in air attacks on Derna. There have been ongoing violent clashes in the southern cities of Ubari, Sebha and Kufrah. During 2016, there have been a number of clashes between militias in the Tripoli suburbs of Abu Sleem, Ghoat Shaal, Bab Ben Gashir, and Zawia...

'GNA- aligned forces, supported by U.S. airstrikes, have made advances against Daesh in Sirte. But although Daesh now only control a small central area of Sirte, they remain a serious threat to security in Libya. During January and February, Daesh launched attacks on oil facilities at Es Sider (Sidra) and Ras Lanuf. In Derna, there is an ongoing conflict between the Libyan

⁴³Amnesty International: Libya: World must help pull Libya out of human rights chaos five years since uprising that ousted al-Gaddafi' date published 16 February 2016 <https://amnesty.ca/news/world-must-help-pull-libya-out-human-rights-chaos-five-years-uprising-ousted-al-gaddafi> Date accessed 17 February 2016

⁴⁴ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 25 February 2016, (paragraph 40) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d697d84.html> Date accessed 24 November 2016

⁴⁵ US State Department, Report on Human Rights Practices 2015, Libya, section 1g, 13 April 2016, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#section1guse> Date accessed 24 November 2016

National Army and local armed groups. In June and July, there were clashes in and around Ajdabiya after extremists calling themselves the Benghazi Defence Brigades sought to seize the town. On 2 August, dozens of Libyan Army troops were killed in a terrorist car bomb in Benghazi.⁴⁶

- 9.1.9 The UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) noted on their Libya Travel Advice for UK nationals updated September 2016 that:

‘There is a high threat from terrorism. Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places visited by foreigners. These could target foreign and diplomatic personnel and premises, international hotels, commercial and oil installations, and government and other official security institutions. Extremist groups including Daesh (formerly referred to as ISIL) are responsible for the majority of attacks. Attacks are more frequent in areas where Daesh has a strong presence and capability such as Sirte, Darnah, Benghazi, Ajdabiya and Sabratha, but can and do occur throughout the country’.⁴⁷

- 9.1.10 The UN Secretary General in his report to the UN Security Council covering the period from 25 February to early May 2016 noted:

‘... the security situation remained fragile both in the capital and across the country... Meanwhile, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) affiliates made new attempts to expand their reach, and armed conflict in Benghazi and elsewhere added to the plight of the civilian population...

‘The security situation in the capital and its environs remained largely calm after the arrival in Tripoli of the Presidency Council. The Presidency Council took its temporary seat at the naval base in downtown Tripoli, protected by Libyan army and police units under the command of the Temporary Security Committee, as well as by armed groups nominally subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. Nonetheless, a few minor clashes took place between security forces and opposing armed groups. In one such incident, on the day of its arrival, members of one group briefly occupied Martyrs’ Square in central Tripoli, but quickly withdrew when confronted by forces supportive of the Presidency Council. On 3 April (2016), clashes erupted around the offices of the al-Nabaa television station, a media outlet largely perceived as opposed to the Libyan Political Agreement...

‘Despite the relative calm, tensions continued in the capital. Tripoli remained controlled by more than 40 rival armed groups originating from the capital and nearby cities and areas. On 28 March (2016), clashes erupted in the western Gorji neighbourhood of Tripoli between a local armed group and the Amazigh-dominated National Mobile Force after one of its members had been killed. On 16 April (2016), a subsequent clash, in central Tripoli in the vicinity of the home of a Presidency Council member and also involving the National Mobile Force, saw two of the Force’s members killed...

⁴⁶ UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Libya Advice: Safety & Security – last updated 21 September 2016 <https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/libya/safety-and-security> Date accessed 29 September 2016

⁴⁷ UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Libya Travel Advice – Terrorism – last updated 8 April 2016 <https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/libya/terrorism> Date accessed 21 April 2016

'While the security situation in the wider western region remained fragile, local ceasefire arrangements proved sufficiently resilient to prevent incidents from escalating. However, on 23 March (2016), fighting broke out between rival armed groups from Warshafanah and Zawiyah, resulting in at least 15 fatalities. Following several days of clashes, mediation by tribal elders and other armed groups put an end to the fighting.'⁴⁸

9.1.11 The same report also commented on the security situation in the East of the country:

'Armed confrontations in eastern Libya continued during the reporting period. In Benghazi, fighting escalated between forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, a coalition of Islamist armed groups, and ISIL. On 20 February (2016), General Haftar launched a new military offensive with the stated objective of evicting the Shura Council and its allies from the city. Forces loyal to General Haftar initially made significant territorial gains, dislodging the Shura Council and ISIL from the central Leithi and eastern Buatni areas, as well as from much of the southern Hawari neighbourhood. ...

'Following three weeks of intense clashes, fighting in Benghazi subsided in mid-March and continued at a lower level. Despite incurring significant losses, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and its allies, bolstered by additional weapons, ammunition and fighters transported by sea from its allies in western Libya, retained control of and defended its positions in the southern Qar Younis, Qawarsha and Qanfouda areas and the northern Sabri area. The northern Sabri area is an ISIL stronghold. In mid-April, General Haftar's forces, supported by continued air strikes, acquired control of the cement factory in the Hawari area and of the University of Benghazi in Qar Younis, two positions long held by the Shura Council...

'In Derna, ISIL withdrew from its last positions in neighbourhood No. 400 and the Fata'ih area south of the city, following clashes in mid-April (2016) with the Derna Mujaheddin Shura Council and allied army elements. The Shura Council subsequently announced that the city had been cleared of the presence of ISIL.'⁴⁹

9.1.12 The same source reported on the situation in the south of the country:

'In Awbari, the implementation of a ceasefire agreement reached on 22 November in Qatar between representatives of the Tuareg and Tebu communities proceeded without any major incidents during the reporting period. In accordance with the agreement, all armed groups withdrew from the city and 44 detainees were released following an exchange of prisoners. The reopening of Awbari airport and the main route connecting Awbari with

⁴⁸ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, paras 2, 12-14, 16 May 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/N1613214.pdf>, Date accessed on 23 May 2016

⁴⁹ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, paras 15-17, 16 May 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/N1613214.pdf>, Date accessed 23 May 2016

the north-east facilitated the flow of goods and the movement of people, in addition to a gradual stabilization of the overall situation...

'In Sabha, intercommunal tensions continued to have an impact on the overall security situation, with cases of revenge killings reported between the Awlad Sulayman community, on the one hand, and the Qadhadhfa and Tebu communities, on the other...

'In Kufrah, in the south-east, a partial lifting of the siege that Zway armed militias had laid to the Tebu neighbourhoods contributed to a slightly improved security situation.'⁵⁰

9.1.13 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) reported on 23 August 2016 on demining operations near the battlefield in Sirte 'where Libyan forces are edging closer to defeating the so-called Islamic State. The militant group's mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have already left hundreds of Libyan fighters dead and maimed and, as government forces continue to advance into the centre of the town, poorly equipped de-mining units are struggling to deal with the aftermath. International de-mining organisations are loath to work in Libya ...

'so these explosives threaten to leave a terrifying legacy for civilians long after the war is over. Just 200 metres ahead of Mohammed and his colleagues, a child's bicycle lies in the middle of the road. It looks innocent but the men have spotted a trap; a thin wire leads from the bike to a rigged tank shell. Anyone attempting to use the road would have to move the bicycle, triggering the explosive mechanism. To add to the danger, Mohammed explains that the ground on either side of the road is also mined.In the Ghardabiya district south of Sirte, a former teacher still too scared of IS retribution to give his name, said that with the group gone explosives were now his greatest fear and called on the international community to pitch in. "We urgently need international mine-clearance organisations to come and check the areas around Sirte, especially in the desert areas, because there are just so many mines there," he said. "We are afraid for our children and we are afraid for our future."⁵¹

9.1.14 On 12 September 2016, Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and head of UNSMIL, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities in the oil crescent area:

"I call for the respect of UN Security Council Resolution 2259 which recognises the Government of National Accord consisting of the Presidency Council (PC) and the cabinet as the sole executive authority in Libya. Military forces protecting oil installations must be under the authority of the PC. UNSCR 2259 also contains a clear prohibition on illicit oil exports.

⁵⁰ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, paras 18-20, 16 May 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/N1613214.pdf>, Date accessed 23 May 2016

⁵¹ Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Booby-trapped bicycles, 23 August 2016, available at: <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2016/08/23/booby-trapped-bicycles> Date accessed 24 November 2016

Attacks on the oil terminals further threaten the stability and lead to a greater division of the country. They further restrict the oil exports and add to people's suffering”,

“I urge all parties to avoid any damage to the oil facilities. Natural resources belong to all Libyans and preserving oil infrastructure is in the national interest”, said the Special Representative. He joins the Presidency Council’s calls for a comprehensive national consensus and expresses his support for consultations that would lead to the formation of a new Government of National Accord.”⁵²

9.1.15 On 4 September 2016, Libyan government forces reported that despite facing fierce resistance from Islamic State fighters in Sirte, they expected to regain control of the city within days.⁵³

9.1.16 On 6 October 2016 Martin Kobler, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya, and head of UNSMIL, expressed ‘deep concern over the plight of civilians caught in the cross-fire in a Benghazi neighbourhood’, and ‘called for a humanitarian pause to allow aid to reach those in urgent need and as well as a safe passage for those who wish to leave...’ The UN Special Representative also noted that: ‘the fight against terrorist organizations should be conducted in line with international laws. “The use of civilians as human shields and the carrying out of indiscriminate attacks are prohibited by International Humanitarian Law. Such violations would constitute war crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and their perpetrators would be held accountable.”’⁵⁴

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9.2 Level of violence and number of casualties

9.2.1 The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (Libya) made a statement to the UN Security Council on 5 November 2015. The statement noted:

‘During the reporting period, of the reported 634 separate incidents, a total of at least 1,539 violent deaths were recorded. Total numbers of violent deaths have seen an average monthly increase in 2015. Civilian deaths have fluctuated, though no less than 60 per month have been recorded this year alone...

‘Civilian deaths attributed to ISIL and its allied organisations have been consistently highly numbered than those of other perpetrators in the reported period...

⁵² United Nations Support Mission in Libya: statement published on 12 September 2016 <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=2099710&language=en-US> Date accessed 29 September 2016

⁵³ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: ‘Libyan Government Forces Say on Verge of Regaining City from IS’ date published 4 September 2016 <http://www.rferl.org/a/libya-retaking-islamic-state-held-sirte/27966449.html> Date accessed 20 October 2016

⁵⁴ UN News Service, Libya: ‘As situation worsens, UN envoy calls for pause in fighting near Benghazi’, 6 October 2016 <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55222#.WDb0lxvmCQhttp://www.refworld.org/docid/57f7b929729.html> Date accessed 24 November 2016

'ISIL led attacks have focused on the cities of Derna and Sirte meanwhile significant clashes between Islamist extremists and ISIL in Derna in June saw ISIL driven from the city...

'There have been at least 37 recorded incidences of car or suicide bombings; 26 of which have been attributed to ISIL. Large scale abductions by ISIL have in most cases led either to executions, and in certain cases victims' whereabouts have remained unknown. Persons are executed by ISIL for perceived activities such as spying, homosexuality and social activism...

'My Office is further concerned that heavy military clashes between LNA and Islamist extremists in the Benghazi area have continued with at least 99 civilians reportedly killed between April and August 2015. Airstrikes from LNA, Libya Dawn and international actors have also reportedly resulted in civilian deaths. Civilian homes, places of worship and medical facilities have been repeatedly affected.'⁵⁵

9.2.2 UNOCHA noted in its September 2015 Humanitarian Needs Overview that 'A high proportion of civilians, including women and children, have been killed and injured as the fighting has been concentrated in densely populated urban areas. Over 20,000 civilians have been injured as a result of the conflict between July 2014 and May 2015, with the actual number likely to be higher due to under-reporting and given recent fighting in Benghazi, Sirte, Derna, Sabha and Al Kufra.'⁵⁶

9.2.3 The UN OHCHR report, Shattered Lives, referred in detail to the effect of the violence on buildings and infrastructure in all conflict areas:

'Action On Armed Violence (AOAV)'s data clearly illustrate the disproportionate loss of civilian life due to explosive weapons use in populated areas in Libya. However, these figures alone do not capture the devastation that explosive weapons have caused to civilian lives and communities across the country. In addition to the significant loss of civilian life, the use of explosive weapons in Libyan cities, towns and villages has damaged or destroyed civilian homes and infrastructure, interrupted essential services and destroyed livelihoods...

'The destruction of civilian homes and infrastructure caused by explosive weapon attacks has been extensive throughout Libya. For example, Thuwar⁵⁷ (for explanation see footnote) attacks in Sirte in 2011 using explosive weapons, particularly rocket artillery, left whole sections of the city in rubble.

⁵⁵ International Criminal Court Prosecutor – Libya: Statement to the UN Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011) dated 5 November 2015 (paragraphs 39-45) https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-stat-05-11-2015.aspx Date accessed 28 April 2016

⁵⁶ UNOCHA, 2015 Libya; Humanitarian Needs Overview, September 2015 (Summary, Impact of the crisis) http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1445325925_libya-hno-final-english.pdf Date accessed 5 May 2016

⁵⁷ United Nations – Libya: A/HRC/19/68 'Human Rights Situations that require the Council's attention' published 2 March 2012 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A_HRC_19_68_e_n.doc Date accessed 20 October 2016

The Col [UN International Commission of Inquiry] found buildings damaged and destroyed deep within the city, not just along main roads and the axis of fighting. Gaddhafi's military similarly destroyed large sections of several Libyan cities in 2011. Misurata bore the brunt of the Gaddhafi forces' strikes, with destroyed homes visible along the axis of fighting and damaged homes spread widely throughout the city. According to the Senior Military Adviser to the Col, the destruction of houses and public buildings in the city of Tawergha was complete; virtually every structure in the city bore extensive damage from explosive weapons, making the buildings uninhabitable...

'The Col found that electricity, water supply and communications systems were repeatedly disrupted throughout the 2011 conflict. Only a few places, such as public hospitals, had reliable access to generators. In addition, Qadhafi forces damaged or destroyed several medical facilities, including by shelling with high-explosive weapons such as mortars, artillery rockets and field artillery. These attacks made it difficult for civilians to receive adequate medical care during the conflict, creating a post-war situation where major repairs were needed to return facilities to operation.

'More recent fighting [2015] in Libya has also seen extensive damage to civilian infrastructure due to the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. In June 2014, for example, a Libyan warplane under Haftar's command targeted an Islamist militia base in Benghazi but instead hit a university building. According to witnesses, the warplane fired three rockets that hit the university's engineering faculty, causing huge material damage.'⁵⁸

9.2.4 UNSMIL report of February 2016 stated that 'Ongoing fighting and the indiscriminate shelling of residential areas continued to result in the death and injury of civilians, including children and medical workers, while also causing damage to civilian infrastructure. Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Derna, Kufrah and Warshafanah were particularly affected. Bombings and suicide attacks also claimed the lives of dozens of people, many of them civilians.'⁵⁹

9.2.5 UNSMIL reported on casualty numbers for October and November 2016, stated:

'From 1 October to 31 October 2016, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) documented 102 civilian casualties, including 29 deaths and 73 injured, during the conduct of hostilities across Libya. Victims included 7 children killed and 13 injured, 3 women killed and 6 injured, 19 men killed and 33 injured and 21 persons injured whose age and sex was unknown.'⁶⁰

⁵⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 'Shattered lives: Civilians suffer from the use of explosive weapons in Libya', September 2015, (The human cost of explosive violence in Libya p.25-6) Date accessed 20 October 2016

available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5629e1744.html> date accessed 23 February 2016

⁵⁹ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 25 February 2016, (paragraph 35)

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d697d84.html> date accessed 4 May 2016

⁶⁰ UNSMIL: 'Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties October 2016' published 1 November 2016 <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5662&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=2099766&language=en-US> Date accessed 27 January 2017

'From 1 November to 30 November 2016, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) documented 89 civilian casualties, including 38 deaths and 51 injuries, during the conduct of hostilities across Libya. Victims included 8 children killed and 16 injured, 27 men killed and 28 injured and 3 women killed and 7 injured.'⁶¹

'From 1 December to 31 December 2016, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) documented 10 civilian casualties, including 3 deaths and 7 injured, during the conduct of hostilities across Libya. Victims included 1 child injured, 3 men killed and 1 injured, 1 woman injured, and the sex of the other 4 was not recorded.'⁶²

9.2.6 Human Rights Watch, in their World Report for 2016 – Libya published on 12 January 2017, noted that warring factions continued to indiscriminately shell civilian areas, mostly in Benghazi and Derna in the east and in Sirte. From March until August 2016, 141 civilians were killed in the violence, including 30 children, and 146 injured, including 28 children.⁶³

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9.3 Statistics for 2016

9.3.1 UNSMIL publish monthly figures providing numbers of civilian deaths and casualties for the country as a whole. It records only verifiable incidents; therefore the numbers are not necessarily indicative of the total number. Further information and statistics on civilian deaths and casualties may be accessed on the [UNSMIL website](#). The data from the monthly reports is tabulated below:

2016	Fatalities	Injured	Total
Jan and Feb	28	38	66 ⁶⁴
March	21	11	32 ⁶⁵
April	33	14	47 ⁶⁶

⁶¹ UNSMIL: 'Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties November 2016' <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5662&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=2099801&language=en-US> Date accessed 27 January 2017

⁶² UNSMIL: 'Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties December 2016' published 1 January 2017 <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3559&ctl=Details&mid=6187&ItemID=2099839&language=en-US> Date accessed 27 January 2017

⁶³ Human Rights Watch: World Report Libya 2017 published 12 January 2017 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf Date accessed 26 January 2017

⁶⁴ UNSMIL, Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties, 1 March 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099499&language=en-US>

⁶⁵ UNSMIL, Libya Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties - From 1 March to 31 March 2016, 1 April 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099541&language=en-US>, Date accessed on 1 November 2016

⁶⁶ UNSMIL, Libya Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties - From 1 April to 30 April 2016, 1 May 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099589&language=en-US>

May	24	46	70 ⁶⁷
June	18	31	49 ⁶⁸
July	12	29	41 ⁶⁹
August	15	32	47 ⁷⁰
September	4	7	14 ⁷¹
October	29	73	102 ⁷²
Total	184	281	468

9.3.2 ACCORD compiles maps of casualties for the whole country and specific locations based on data gathered by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) which in turn is based on publicly available reporting. The documents also contain data on the number and location of incidents. It reported that:

- In 2015 there were 2,705 fatalities, of which 1,945 occurred in 'battle', 235 were recorded as 'violence against civilians'.⁷³
- In the first half of 2016, there were 1,294 fatalities of which 981 occurred in 'battle' and 104 were described as 'violence against civilians'.^{74 75}

[uage=en-US](#), Date accessed 1 November 2016

⁶⁷ UNSMIL, Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties - May 2016, 1 June 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099628&language=en-US>, Date accessed 1 November 2016

⁶⁸ UNSMIL, Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties - June 2016, 1 July 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099658&language=en-US>, Date accessed 1 November 2016

⁶⁹ UNSMIL, Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties - July 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099677&language=en-US>, Date accessed 1 November 2016

⁷⁰ UNSMIL, Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties - August 2016, 1 September 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099703&language=en-US>, Date accessed 1 November 2016

⁷¹ UNSMIL, Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties - September 2016, 1 October 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099743&language=en-US>, Date accessed 1 November 2016

⁷² UNSMIL, Human Rights Report on Civilian Casualties - October 2016, 1 November 2016, <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=Details&mid=6187&Itemid=2099766&language=en-US>, Date accessed 1 November 2016

⁷³ ACCORD, Libya, Year 2015: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) compiled by ACCORD, 4 February 2016, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1454926067_2015libya-en.pdf Date accessed 18 May 2016

⁷⁴ ACCORD, Libya, First Quarter 2016: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 3 May 2016, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1462282085_2016q1libya-en.pdf Date accessed 19 May 2016

⁷⁵ ACCORD, Libya, Second Quarter 2016: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), August 2016, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1470726957_2016q2libya-en.pdf Date accessed 1 November 2016

9.3.3 The website, 'Libya Body Count' reported that the total number of violent deaths during 2016 (up to 9 October 2016) was 1,390. This contrasts with 2,825 in 2014, and 1,523 in 2015. These figures include civilians and combatants.⁷⁶ However, the website gathers data from other sources, usually media including single sources only and provides little detail which sources or its exact methodology:


'The purpose of this site is to provide a reference point for the extent of violent crime and deaths in Libya, starting in January 2014 (three years after the 17 February 2011 uprising and civil war).

'The site relies on media reports as the source of data. Libya's media is in its infancy so in most cases only a single news source is used and in a few cases social media is also relied upon.

'No distinction is made regarding victims: all deaths are counted.'⁷⁷

9.3.4 It is therefore not clear how accurate these data are; they represent a guide rather than an exact record of fatalities.

9.3.5 ACCORD also provided the following graph, based on ACLED data, charting the number of incidents and fatalities generally between March 2014 and June 2016:



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9.3.6 The majority of incidents and casualties in 2015 and 2016 were reported to have been in 3 towns / areas: Benghazi, Surt (Sirte) and Darn (Derna). The table below provides relevant data for these areas for 2015 plus that for Tripoli by way of comparison:

⁷⁶ Libya Body Count: 'Because the Libyan Government refuses to count' published 9 October 2016 <http://www.libyabodycount.org/> Date accessed 14 October 2016

⁷⁷ Libya Body Count, About us, undated, <http://www.libyabodycount.org/> Date accessed 14 October 2016

⁷⁸ ACCORD, Libya, Second Quarter 2016: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), August 2016, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1470726957_2016q2libya-en.pdf Date accessed on 1 November 2016

	Incidents	Fatalities
Benghazi	356	893
Surt	135	566
Darnah	119	515
Tripoli	168	111
Total for all regions (including those not listed above)	1,255	2,705

79

9.3.7 While the table below provides data for the first and second quarters of 2016 (the 2 data sets have been combined below):

	Incidents			Fatalities		
	Q1	Q2	Total	Q1	Q2	Total
Benghazi	70	92	162	154	248	402
Surt	33	57	90	95	280	375
Darnah	18	14	32	31	43	74
Tripoli	40	47	87	17	86	103
Total for all regions (including those not listed above)	245	249	496	580	714	1,294

80 81

9.3.8 The levels of violence documented by ACLED in 2016 are similar to 2015 for Benghazi, Darnah, and Surt. However Tripoli is on course, if levels of violence remain constant for the remainder of the year, to almost double its number of fatalities compared to 2015, albeit from a much lower base line compared to the other cities.

9.3.9 Further maps and tables compiled by ACCORD based on information collated by ACLED are available on the [ecoi.net website](http://www.ecoi.net).

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⁷⁹ ACCORD, Libya, Year 2015: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) compiled by ACCORD, 4 February 2016,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1454926067_2015ylibya-en.pdf Date accessed 18 May 2016

⁸⁰ ACCORD, Libya, First Quarter 2016: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 3 May 2016,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1462282085_2016q1libya-en.pdf Date accessed 19 May 2016

⁸¹ ACCORD, Libya, Second Quarter 2016: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), August 2016,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4765_1470726957_2016q2libya-en.pdf Date accessed 1 November 2016

9.4 Security situation by region - sources of information

9.4.1 Sources reporting on the security and human rights situation generally break the country into 3 regions:

- East -including the cities, and surrounding regions, of Benghazi, Darnah and Tobruk;
- West including the cities and surrounding regions of Tripoli, Misrata and Sirte; and
- The South

9.4.2 In their Humanitarian Bulletin of September 2016, UNOCHA reported that:

‘On 11 September, Libyan National Army (LNA) elements forced their way into the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) controlled oil crescent area from both east (Ajdabiya/Benghazi) and southwest (Zella). Attacks reportedly targeted Sidra oil load port, Ras Lanuf oil port and Airport, Zuwetina oil load port, and the area south of Ajdabiya. Reports from the area point to continued clashes among armed groups over the past week...

‘Heavy fighting between LNA forces and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) elements continued during August in the Gwarsha and Ganfouda area of Benghazi, seriously affecting civilian life...

‘Heavy fighting against ISIL has continued in Sirte municipality with Al-Bunyan al-Marsous (ABAM) forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA) reportedly making significant progress...

‘The situation in Derna is deteriorating with reports of LNA forces surrounding the city and closing the main roads between the city and the nearby villages and towns. Movement from and to Derna is reportedly allowed through one road, which is Karsa road that connects Derna to the villages of Ras-Hilal and Soussa north-west of Derna.⁸²

9.4.3 Maps and tables compiled by ACCORD based on reported security incidents collated by ACLED provide a break down of violence by region and location. These are available on the [ecoi.net website](http://ecoi.net). ACLED also periodically covers Libya in its monthly [Conflict Trend Reports](#). Additionally, UNSMIL collates data on the number on casualties which are released in [monthly reports](#).

9.4.4 Additionally, the UN OHCHR and UNSMIL provide reports and briefings on the human rights situation, including security, while the UNHCR’s Refworld database collates source information on a range of human rights issues:

- UN OHCHR:
<http://ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/LYIndex.aspx>
- UNSMIL:
<http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3549&language=en-US>

⁸² UNOCHA: Humanitarian Bulletin – Libya - Issue 7 September 2016 published October 2016
<https://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=GM38X6c13Xw%3d&tabid=5662&mid=6187&language=en-US> Date accessed 14 October 2016

- Refworld: <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&skip=0&query=&coi=LBY>
- UNOCHA, Middle East and North Africa: <http://www.unocha.org/romena/about-us/about-ocha-regional/libya>

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10. Humanitarian situation

10.1.1 The UNOCHA report, 'Shattered Lives' reported in September 2015:

'In February 2015, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported extensive damage to civilian property and infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and clinics, caused by shelling...

'Damage to civilian infrastructure and public property has affected the State's ability to deliver basic services, such as education and health care. In addition to damage inflicted on service-delivery facilities, the security threat posed by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has caused an exodus of skilled foreign workers, including nurses, teachers and labourers, upon whom the country depends. The closure of many schools and universities has forced families to relocate despite limited resources in most cases.'⁸³

10.1.2 According to the website of the World Food Programme, accessed on 28 April 2016:

'Armed conflict and political instability has impacted the lives of more than three million people across Libya. An estimated 2.44 million people are in need of protection and some form of humanitarian assistance, 55 percent of whom are women and children. An estimated 435,000 people have been forcibly displaced from their homes and another 1.75 million non-displaced Libyans, most residing in urban centres, are in need of humanitarian assistance. The displaced are among the most vulnerable due to their loss of income and assets, limited coping capacity and insecurity, in particular displaced women, children, the elderly and those with low economic means. Refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants are also among the most vulnerable due to similar factors, as well as their exposure to social discrimination and exploitation. The cumulative effects of the conflict and the lack of access to disrupted public services, is particularly felt in both the east and south of the country.'⁸⁴

⁸³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 'Shattered lives: Civilians suffer from the use of explosive weapons in Libya', September 2015, (4. The human cost of explosive violence in Libya p. 27-28) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5629e1744.html> Date accessed 23 February 2016

⁸⁴ World Food Programme: Operations – Assistance to people affected by the crisis in Libya –undated <https://www.wfp.org/operations/200925-assistance-people-affected-crisis-libya> Date accessed 28 April 2016

10.1.3 REACH - a joint initiative of two international non-governmental organizations - ACTED and IMPACT Initiatives - and the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) stated in June 2016 that, 'June 2016 saw an increase in reported threats to people's physical safety in assessed communities, with particularly high rates of theft (reported by 69%), assault (60%) and kidnapping (64%) reported by respondents in the South. Deaths by small arms were reported in 93% of assessed municipalities, while deaths from unexploded ordnance were reported in a third of all assessed municipalities, and in up to 80% of those in the East. In all cases, adult males were the most commonly affected demographic group. Among IDPs, loss of documentation was reportedly common, affecting people's ability to access cash, social security and basic services.'⁸⁵

10.1.4 UNICEF stated, in their Libya Humanitarian Update for July, 2016:

'UNICEF partner CESVI – an international NGO - conducted a child protection rapid assessment for Sirte Internally displaced Persons (IDP) in Bani Walid. The assessment established a need for community based child protection and psychosocial support for the internationally displaced and host community children. The assessment also identified and mapped the availability and gaps of child protection services. Two sites were identified through the assessment, in close consultation with local authorities and tribal leaders, to be used as locations for community based child protection services. Two Child Friendly Spaces were established in the last week of July to provide services for an estimated 4,000 affected children in the cities...

'The education authorities reported that in Sirte, Bani Walid and Tarhuna cities, 64 schools are partially damaged or accommodating IDPs, representing 17 per cent of the total number of schools in the three cities...

'By the end of July UNHCR reports that a total of 37,744 individuals have been registered in Libya, among which 9300 are registered as refugees and 28,444 are registered as asylum-seekers.'⁸⁶

10.1.5 On 27-28 September 2016, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNSMIL addressed the 33rd session of the Human Rights Council:

'...The Government is spending 93% of its total budget on subsidies and salaries, including those of members of armed groups that are not under the control of the Government. People face daily hardships, putting up with prolonged power cuts and lack of cash. People are queuing for hours, every day, to withdraw limited amount of money...

⁸⁵ Reach Multisector Needs Assessment June 2016 <http://www.reach-initiative.org/libya-reach-multi-sector-needs-assessment-update> Date accessed 24 November 2016

⁸⁶ UNICEF Libya Humanitarian Situation Report, published 31 July 2016 <http://reliefweb.int/report/libya/unicef-libya-humanitarian-situation-report-july-2016> Date accessed 20 October 2016

'The medical system is broken and many schools are out of use. What should be a wealthy and developed country is increasingly struggling with providing basic services to its people.'⁸⁷

10.1.6 UNICEF noted, in their Libya Humanitarian Situation report for August 2016:

'On 11 August, the Presidency Council announced military advances in the fight against the Islamic State in the city of Sirte. Returns of displaced populations are expected to accelerate once the Government of National Accord announces military success in the city of Sirte. Families returning to the city are facing difficult conditions, with reports of an urgent need for drinking water and basic supplies, including food stocks. Health services have been severely disrupted with lack of life-saving medicine. Explosive remnants of war and explosive devices are of particular concern...

'In Tripoli, several protests and strikes were reported, mainly due to the increasing frequency of lengthy electricity and water outages. In some areas where conflict has ended, delays in the repair of schools and roads and in restoring access to water have impeded the process of the return of IDPS...

'During the month of August, IOM identified a total of 348,372 Internally Displaced Persons, 310,265 returnees and 276,957 migrants in Libya, while UNHCR reports that the agency has registered to date 37,744 individuals, among which 28,444 are asylum seekers while 9,300 are refugees.'⁸⁸

10.1.7 On 21 November 2016, the UN News Service reported:

'The United Nations is extremely concerned by the continued worsening humanitarian situation in Ganfouda area in the Libyan city of Benghazi due to increased hostilities over the past week... "I am extremely worried by the impact on civilians of intense fighting in and around the Ganfouda area," the Libya Humanitarian Coordinator, Ghassan Khalil, said in a statement. He also noted that many people remaining in the area have limited or no access to drinking water or food, while other essential goods and medical supplies are running critically low. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Ganfouda district has been inaccessible for many months for aid organizations, leaving civilians in dire and urgent need of protection and humanitarian assistance.'⁸⁹

10.1.8 Sources for further information

Further updates on the humanitarian situation are available via:

⁸⁷ Address of the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 31/27 27-28 September 2016 <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Images/Articles/Images/20160927-01.jpg> Date accessed 14 October 2016

⁸⁸ UNICEF: Libya – Humanitarian Situation Report – August 2016 published September 2016 <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Libya%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report-August%202016.pdf> Date accessed 19 October 2016

⁸⁹ UN News Service, Libya: UN voices extreme concern at worsening humanitarian situation in Benghazi, 22 November 2016 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5834722e40c.html>, Date accessed 24 November 2016

- Reliefweb, Libya: <http://reliefweb.int/country/lby>
- Refworld: <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&skip=0&query=&coi=LBY>
- UNOCHA, Middle East and North Africa: <http://www.unocha.org/romena/about-us/about-ocha-regional/libya>

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10.2 Healthcare

10.2.1 UNOCHA considered in its 2015 Humanitarian Needs Overview that:

‘The conflict has restricted access to basic goods and services, including health, food, water and sanitation and education. The healthcare system has deteriorated to the point of collapse, leading to an increase in serious illness and disease. The already fragile health system has been coming under increasing strain, with hospitals struggling to cope with the number of patients and dwindling resources, including a shortage of staff and essential medicines and supplies. Most foreign healthcare workers have fled the country and despite the increase in needs, there has been an overall decreasing level of investment in the health sector. As a result, an estimated 1.9 million people in Libya require humanitarian aid to meet their basic healthcare needs, with particular concern in Benghazi, Tripoli, Derna, Sirte, Al Jifarah, Al Kufra, Wadi Al Hayat and Ghat.’⁹⁰

10.2.2 The UNHCR, in their Position on Returns to Libya of October 2015, stated:

‘The health system has come under severe strain as a result of the conflict. Medical facilities report overcrowding amidst diminished capacity, following the exodus of foreign health workers who used to make up a majority of health staff in the country. In conflict areas, access to health services is severely hampered due to insecurity. In Benghazi, only three out of seven major hospitals remain operational amidst increasing numbers of patients with war-related injuries. Lack of medicines and medical supplies and/or the increased prices of medicine have also been reported. Access to mental health and psychosocial support is very limited due to the lack of functioning facilities and specialized staff.’⁹¹

10.2.3 The United Nations News Service reported on 28 January 2016:

“We cannot wait for a political solution in order to respond, we need to act now,” Syed Jaffar Hussain, WHO Representative for Libya, said during a special briefing on Libya in Geneva...

⁹⁰ UNOCHA, 2015 Libya;, September 2015 (Summary, Priority humanitarian needs) http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1445325925_libya-hno-final-english.pdf, Date accessed 5 May 2016

⁹¹ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya - Update I, October 2015, (paragraph 13) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/561cd8804.html> Date accessed 18 February 2016

"The health situation in Libya is rapidly deteriorating, with extensive displacement, damage and closure of health facilities in conflict areas," stressed Reida Oakely, Libya's Minister of Health...

'Of great concern are health risks such as increased communicable diseases, outbreaks of measles and polio, mortality, as well as limited healthcare, services and prevention especially for vulnerable groups...

"We need both financial resources and the international humanitarian community to step up efforts to help save the lives of children, mothers and the elderly who are most at risk," said Mr. Hussain, adding "this is not about politics; it is about health needs."...

'The UN health agency and its partners are also facing some serious challenges on the ground. There are critical shortages of health care workers as the majority of nursing staff were evacuated in 2014. Further, health facilities such as hospitals, laboratories, blood banks are limitedly functional while life-saving medicines and vaccines are also in short supply...

"We are calling on all parties to guarantee unrestricted, long term delivery of humanitarian aid and unconditional movement of health workers," urged Mr. Hussain. Since November 2015, WHO has been able to reach almost 250,000 people through the provision of medicines, mobile clinics, health teams, provision of fuel and safe water...

'However, "we need to be able to reach all affected people to identify health needs, assess nutritional status, and ensure health services are available. If access for the provision of aid is not made immediately available, millions of people are at risk of facing a humanitarian and health disaster," underscored Mr. Hussain...

'Currently WHO and health partners are seeking \$50 million to meet the urgent needs of some 2 million people in Libya. In addition to tackling health risks, the funds will also be used to strengthen the existing health structure and provide temporary mobile clinics and outreach services...

'Since the escalation of the conflict in July 2014, violence and instability have spread to all around the country, with more than 3 million people - nearly half of the total population - affected. Almost 2 and a half million people are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, of which 1.9 million people have serious, unmet health needs.⁹²

10.2.4 UNOCHA reported in its February 2016 Libya humanitarian bulletin that:

'More than 40 per cent of the health facilities in Libya are not functioning, affected by ongoing conflict, a lack of medical personnel, and limited electricity. Maternal health issues including; unsafe abortion; lack of postnatal and antenatal care are on the rise. Births at home without a trained birth attendant are now on the rise. Health personnel have fled the country. More than 80 per cent of all nursing staff were evacuated in 2014. Attacks on

⁹² UN News Service, Dire health situation of 2 million Libyans 'cannot wait for political solution' to conflict – UN agency official, published 28 January 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56b0725940c.html> Date accessed 17 February 2016

health care workers also continue, with five health workers killed and more than 20 health facilities damaged in the past 18 months alone. An acute shortage of life-saving medicines throughout hospitals and clinics across Libya is further threatening the provision of health care.⁹³

10.2.5 Medecins Sans Frontiers President Dr. Mego Terzian stated on 27 April 2016 that:

‘The health situation has worsened sharply since 2011. Before then, Libya’s health care system functioned well. But hospitals have since closed or are operating on a reduced schedule because of damage or lack of resources. In Benghazi, for example, the psychiatric hospital, the maternity hospital, which had 400 beds, and two other hospitals have closed. According to health authorities, all of the hospitals in the east are severely affected by a lack of funds to purchase drugs and consumables and a lack of medical staff. The health system in the west is experiencing the same problems... The Ministries of Health in both the western and eastern governments have very limited resources and are having a hard time paying medical staff. Those employees also began leaving the hospitals in 2011, followed by a second wave of departures in 2014.’⁹⁴

10.2.6 An August 2016 report by Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) gave the following information about Sirte and the surrounding area: ‘The medical situation has become particularly desperate. Ali [a resident of the area] points out that many of Sirte’s hospital staff had been foreigners. “[They] either fled or were imprisoned by IS, and gradually all the medicines ran out even before the fighting started... Chronic food shortages exacerbate the medical emergency. Deliveries of food, as well as medicines, to Sirte stopped many months ago, after according to local media reports, IS repeatedly abducted lorry drivers.’⁹⁵

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10.3 Education

10.3.1 The UNOHCHR stated:

‘Children in Libya have faced significant challenges to the enjoyment of their rights, including education. The issues limiting girls’ access to education are particularly pronounced - especially in areas controlled by Ansar al-Sharia and groups pledging allegiance to ISIL. Difficulties have also been encountered in

⁹³ UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin Libya: The crisis that should not be, 16 February 2016 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/humanitarian_bulletin_-_v1.11_-_22022016_0.pdf Date accessed 4 May 2016

⁹⁴ MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières: Hospitals closed or operating on a reduced schedule, 27 April 2016 <http://www.msf.org/en/article/libya-hospitals-closed-or-operating-reduced-schedule> Date accessed 24 November 2016

⁹⁵ Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Life on the edge of Libya’s battle against Islamic State, 9 August 2016, <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2016/08/08/life-edge-libya%E2%80%99s-battle-against-islamic-state> Date accessed 24 November 2016

Tripoli. Groups pledging allegiance to ISIL have forcibly recruited and used children in hostilities, and in some cases, subjected them to sexual abuse.⁹⁶

10.3.2 The report also stated:

‘In 2005, Libya was considered the country with the highest literacy and educational enrolment rates in North Africa. According to a study published in June 2015, half of the children in Libya are not attending school.

‘Some 40 per cent of schools in Libya have been damaged since the armed conflict in 2011. That number has further increased following the fighting in 2014 and 2015. In Benghazi, it is reported that 73 per cent of all schools are not functioning, with schools having been either damaged, destroyed, occupied by internally displaced persons, converted into military or detention facilities, or otherwise dangerous to reach...

‘Amongst the cases investigated by OHCHR was, for instance, the use of a primary school in Benghazi as a base and a detention facility by an armed group. UNOSAT satellite imagery of the school obtained as at August 2015 showed the presence of several cargo vehicles, possibly used for military purposes. Many children are residing in camps for displaced persons, without access to proper education facilities. A recent study noted that children with disabilities have difficulties in accessing any form of education, and are often completely excluded from the formal education system.’⁹⁷

10.3.3 The UNICEF – Libya Humanitarian Situation report for August, 2016, stated:

‘The education sector continues the provision of education and recreation support activities with particular support to IDPs and highly affected cities. Through partnership with local partners, a total of 3,741 children (2,119 boys and 1,622 girls) attended catch up classes for out of school children in Benghazi city, and remedial education classes and recreational activities for children at risk of dropping out from schools in 10 cities... ‘Ministry of Education data shows that 558 schools in different regions of the country are not functional, affecting approximately 279,000 school-aged children. Recent data collected from the Ministry’s offices in the cities of Sirte, Bani Walid and Tarhuna revealed that a total of 223 schools (54 per cent) need some type of maintenance among which 108 schools need heavy construction work maintenance.. UNICEF signed an agreement with the national NGO, Libyan Association for Youth and Development, to provide assistance and recreational activities to 691 students who dropped out of school in five cities from the South...’⁹⁸

⁹⁶ United Nations Human Rights Council: ‘Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings’ published 15 February 2016 (11. Children paragraph 307) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html> Date accessed 9 March 2016

⁹⁷ United Nations Human Rights Council: ‘Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings’ published 15 February 2016 (F. Economic, social and cultural rights, 3. Findings (b) Right to education paragraphs 200-201) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html> Date accessed 9 March 2016

⁹⁸ UNICEF: Libya – Humanitarian Situation Report – August 2016 published September 2016 <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Libya%20Humanitarian%20Situation>

10.4 Sanitation

10.4.1 The UNOHCHR report (15 February 2016) stated:

'The armed conflict has resulted in the disruption of main water networks, affecting access to safe drinking water, and water adequate for sanitation and hygiene. In some cases this disruption appears to have been deliberate. In one case investigated by OHCHR in Al-Nasiriyah, armed groups were reported to have destroyed a water-well, by breaking the pumps and congesting the well, rendering it unusable.'⁹⁹

10.4.2 The UNHCR, in their Position on Returns to Libya of October 2015, stated:

'Water, gas and electricity supply are reportedly frequently disrupted, although the degree of disruption varies from one location to another. The quantity and quality of drinking water are of concern especially in areas where the water network infrastructure has sustained damage as a result of conflict. Access to sanitation is considered problematic for IDPs living in inadequate shelter arrangements. Garbage collection has reportedly been disrupted in Benghazi, creating health hazards.'¹⁰⁰

10.4.3 The UNICEF Libya Humanitarian Situation – Midyear report 2016, noted: 'UNICEF and its WASH partners, the Libyan society for Charity work and ACTED have been working to provide equitable, sustainable and adequate access to safe water supply, sanitation and hygiene for conflict affected populations in Libya, especially women and children...'¹⁰¹

10.4.4 For further details regarding hygiene and sanitation in Libya, please refer to the [Unicef Humanitarian Situation reports for Libya](#), which are updated regularly.

10.5 Internal displacement

10.5.1 The Norwegian Refugee Council, in conjunction with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, produced a map of Libya on 30 March 2015, showing the numbers of Libyans displaced from their home, and the areas from which they were displaced.¹⁰²

[%20Report-August%202016.pdf](#) Date accessed 19 October 2016

⁹⁹ United Nations Human Rights Council: 'Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings' published 15 February 2016 ((c) Right to food and water paragraph 204 and (e) Humanitarian assistance paragraph 206)

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d00d0f4.html> Date accessed 9 March 2016

¹⁰⁰ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya - Update I, October 2015, (paragraph 16) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/561cd8804.html> Date accessed 18 February 2016

¹⁰¹ UNICEF Libya Humanitarian Situation Midyear report 2016 published <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Libya%20%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20%28Mid-Year%202016%29.pdf> Date accessed 19 October 2016

¹⁰² Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), Internal displacement in Libya (March 2015), published 30 March 2015, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/552240134.html> Date accessed 18 February 2016

10.5.2 UNOCHA considered in its September 2015 Humanitarian Needs Overview that:

'The displaced are the most vulnerable due to limited coping capacity and loss of assets, particularly displaced women, children, the elderly and those with low economic means. Refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants are also considered some of the most vulnerable, due to their exposed risk to discrimination and exploitation based on their status. The most severe needs in terms of geographic areas are those of affected people in the east and south of the country... Most of the displaced are living in urban centres within host communities, with just over 100,000 living in collective centres in the open or in makeshift buildings such as schools and empty warehouses. ... 175,000 IDPs are food insecure. The largest number of displaced are located in Benghazi, Al Jabal Al Ghabi, Al Zawiya, Tripoli and Misrata.'¹⁰³ The report includes a map detailing the number of internally displaced persons by region and a graph of the people in need by region.

10.5.3 The UNHCR spokesperson went on to state that:

"Landmines and unexploded ordinance are also a danger to the internally displaced."

"The conflict has also undermined the security of civilians and prevented the safe return of IDPs in Misrata, Tripoli, Warshafana and the Nafusa Mountains in the west, and Awbari in the south. IDPs and host communities in these areas have also been equally affected by diminishing access to education, affordable health care, electricity and other key services'.

"Despite the mounting challenges, we have, through partners on the ground, distributed non-food items to more than 10,000 IDPs in Misrata since May. The distribution initially targeted newly displaced populations and vulnerable groups. This represents 17,000, more than half of the IDP population in Misrata."

'With sporadic fighting in the south and a resumption of tribal tensions between the Tebu and Tuareg communities, the displacement situation threatens to become protracted with many IDPs unable to return or returning to unsustainable conditions such as in the border province of Awbari. "Access to southern Libya and delivery of relief items remains a challenge for us because of conflict and disrupted supply chains."¹⁰⁴

10.5.4 The UNOCHA report of September 2015 states:

'The widespread use of explosive weapons has left dangerous ERW [explosive remnants of war] dispersed across Libya, with some locations heavily contaminated. ERW can continue to pose a serious threat until they are removed, a process that sometimes takes decades. Children in particular

¹⁰³ UNOCHA, 2015 Libya; Humanitarian Needs Overview, September 2015 (Summary, Priority humanitarian needs) http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1445325925_libya-hno-final-english.pdf Date accessed 5 May 2016

¹⁰⁴ UN News Service, 'Internal displacement doubles in Libya since September, UN refugee agency warns', 30 June 2015, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5596687f40c.html> Date accessed 18 February 2016

are at risk of being killed or maimed by ERW. Furthermore, ERW can deprive the civilian population of access to land, schools, water points, religious sites and other locations necessary for their well-being. ERW can hamper peace initiatives and relief and development activities, prevent the return of refugees and the resettlement of displaced people, and slow down the rebuilding of infrastructure and the resumption of normal daily life.¹⁰⁵

10.5.5 The UNHCR, in their Position on Returns to Libya of October 2015, stated:

‘The majority of IDPs require varying degrees of support, including food, non-food items, and alternative shelter for those accommodated in schools and other public facilities. Host communities are reported to be under growing strain from the influx of IDPs; they are also reported to struggle with rising prices for food, cooking oil and fuel, which in some cases have doubled compared to the price level before the start of the conflict. Asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants are reported to be particularly vulnerable in terms of access to basic services across most sectors. Due to their status, they are reportedly frequently denied access to basic services, including health care and education....

‘Shelter has been identified as an urgent need across the country. Initially, many IDPs were taken in by relatives or local communities. However, as the number of IDPs continued to rise, host communities’ capacity to absorb IDPs has been exhausted. As a result, shelter arrangements for many IDPs range from rented accommodation to schools, factories, garages and empty buildings. In the southern desert border town of Ghat some IDP families live in empty water tanks. The destruction and looting of homes has been reported as a reason for displacement...

‘Many IDPs have been displaced multiple times as they sought to escape the widening geographic area affected by the conflict. As a result of these multiple displacements, they are at risk of becoming disconnected from their social, economic and assistance networks.’

‘While new displacement is ongoing, some IDPs have been able to return to their place of origin, often, however, to unsustainable conditions. Ongoing insecurity in many parts of the country, the destruction of homes and infrastructure as well as the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance prevent the return of many IDPs, as a result of which their displacement situation is at risk of becoming protracted.’¹⁰⁶

10.5.6 A March 2016 Save the Children report which assessed the situation in Tripoli and Benghazi stated that:

‘The person with specific vulnerabilities identified as the most at risk, in priority order:

¹⁰⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Shattered lives: Civilians suffer from the use of explosive weapons in Libya’, September 2015, : <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5629e1744.html> Date accessed 24 November 2016

¹⁰⁶ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya - Update I, October 2015, (paragraphs 10, 14 and 18) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/561cd8804.html> Date accessed 18 February 2016

'1. Female head of households (16% of interviewed households)

'2. Persons with disabilities (3.4% of the population assessed)

'3. The chronically ill (7% of the population assessed).

'According to key informants in Benghazi, the age group considered the most at risk are, in priority order:

'1. Older persons (60+ years old, 8.3% of the population assessed)

'2. Children under 5 years old, 24% of the population assessed

'3. Women (18-59 years old), 22.5% of the population assessed.

'Among the displaced populations, key informants in Benghazi (no data for Tripoli) report that the most affected population groups are, in order of priority:

'1. IDPs in rented houses

'2. IDPs in public buildings (schools, mosques)

'3. IDPs hosted by relatives.'¹⁰⁷

10.5.7 The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of the International Office of Migration released its Round 5 Tracking Report on 12 August 2016, covering the reporting period of July and August. The report stated:

'Based on assessment of 100 baladiyas and 533 muhallas in Libya, the report has identified and located 348,372 IDPs and 310,265 returnees ... 'The most notable changes observed since the previous round of reporting included an increase in the number of returnees to Benghazi, following the reduction of conflict in many districts, as well as growing return movements to Derna, Az Zawiyah, Gwalesh, Sabha, As Sidr and Kikla.

'These findings were complemented by a decrease in the number of IDPs identified in Benghazi, Tobruk, Tripoli, Az Zawiyah and Derna.'¹⁰⁸

10.5.8 An Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) report from August 2016 stated:

'A 2006 census counted 150,000 people in Sirte, the hometown of former ruler Muammar Gaddafi. But an estimated 80 percent of the population has fled; some 50,000 in the last two weeks of April alone ... Tens of thousands of civilians displaced from Sirte have struggled to find shelter in other parts of the country. Hundreds of families have remained on the edge of the town, both throughout IS's year-long rule and during the past three months of fighting.'¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Save the Children, Protection Assessment in Libya, 21 March 2016 (A. Executive Summary p.4) <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/160322%20FINAL%20PAL%20Report.pdf> Date accessed 5 May 2016

¹⁰⁸ Libya: Humanitarian Support to Migrants and IDPS – International Organisation for Migration – Situation Report August 2016 date published <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/sitrep-Libya-August2016.pdf> Date accessed 12 October 2016

¹⁰⁹ Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Life on the edge of Libya's battle against Islamic State, 9 August 2016, <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2016/08/08/life-edge-libya%E2%80%99s-battle-against-islamic-state> Date accessed 24 November 2016

11. Freedom of movement

11.1.1 The United States State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2015, in its report published on 13 April 2016, stated:

‘The Constitutional Declaration recognizes freedom of movement, including foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, although the government has the ability to restrict freedom of movement. The law provides the government with the power to restrict a person’s movement if it views that person as a “threat to public security or stability” based on the person’s “previous actions or affiliation with an official or unofficial apparatus or tool of the former regime.”’¹¹⁰

11.1.2 The report continued:

‘Political instability and continuing violence created an inhospitable environment for internally displaced persons, refugees, and migrants seeking to go to Europe by sea. At the end of the year, UNHCR was unable to resume refugee status determinations in the country. The lack of a physical presence by UNHCR or the IOM was an additional obstacle to providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.’¹¹¹

11.1.3 Travel within the country continued to be difficult, due to the presence of Islamist and other militia checkpoints. The USSD report of 13 April 2016 stated:

‘After the outbreak of armed conflict in 2014, the government did not exercise control over in-country movement, although the military established checkpoints targeting extremist movements around Benghazi and Derna.

‘Militias effectively controlled regional movements through armed checkpoints. Militia checkpoints and those imposed by Da’esh, Ansar al Sharia, and other extremist organizations impeded movement within the country and, in some areas, prohibited women from moving freely without a male escort.’¹¹²

¹¹⁰ United States State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Libya – 2015 published 13 April 2016 (section 2.d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons)

¹¹¹ United States State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Libya – 2015 published 13 April 2016 (section 2.d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons)

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dliid=252937>

Date accessed 20 April 2016

¹¹² United States State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Libya – 2015 published 13 April 2016 (section 2.d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons)

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dliid=252937>

Date accessed 20 April 2016

11.1.4 Amnesty International recorded in its 2015/6 annual report that ‘Women faced arbitrary restrictions on their freedom of movement. Those travelling without a male companion were harassed by militias, and in some cases prevented from travelling abroad, in accordance with a 2012 fatwa by Libya’s Grand Mufti.’¹¹³

11.1.5 Freedom House, in their 2016 Freedom in the World – Libya report, noted:

‘Airports in Benghazi, Tripoli, Sabha, and Misrata have been attacked and destroyed, severely limiting access to air travel. As of September 2015, UNHCR estimated that 435,000 people were internally displaced in Libya, and hundreds of thousands have reportedly sought safety in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt. Government and militia checkpoints also restrict movement within Libya, while poor security conditions more generally affect movement as well as access to work and education...’¹¹⁴ The number of displaced persons has now reduced to approximately 313,236, according to the International Office of Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix.¹¹⁵

11.2 Ports and airports

11.2.1 The UNOCHA report, ‘Shattered Lives’ stated:

‘Explosive weapon attacks have also led to the closure of Libya’s two busiest international airports. Benghazi International Airport has been closed since May 2014 due to the proximity of ongoing clashes. It was Libya’s second busiest airport, serving as a travel hub for the entire east. Travellers alternatively use Al Abrag Airport, roughly 220 km to the east. Mohamed, First Officer at Alafriqiyah Airways, explained: “This small, regional airport was built to host four flights per day and now sees as many as 25 domestic and international departures within 24 hours.”

‘Tripoli airport has been inoperable since July 2014, when Libya Dawn forces launched an attack that destroyed 90 per cent of the parked aircraft, according to one Government official, eventually setting the airport ablaze.’¹¹⁶

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¹¹³ Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2015/16 - The State of the World's Human Rights - Libya, 24 February 2016

https://www.amnesty.org.nz/sites/default/files/air201516-english_2016-02-10_12-35-56.pdf Date accessed 4 May 2016

¹¹⁴ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016, Libya, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/libya>, Date accessed on 10 October 2016

¹¹⁵ International Office of Migration: Libya Crisis – IOM Response Situation Report October 2016 Displacement Tracking Matrix. October 2016

https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/IOM_Libya_Situation_Report_2016_October.pdf Date accessed 15 December 2016

¹¹⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Shattered lives: Civilians suffer from the use of explosive weapons in Libya’, September 2015, (4. The human cost of explosive violence in Libya p.27 available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5629e1744.html> Date accessed 23 February 2016

Version control and contacts

Contacts

If you have any questions about this note and your line manager, senior caseworker or technical specialist cannot help you, or you think that this note has factual errors then [email the Country Policy and Information Team](#).

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Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

- version **2.0**
- valid from **27 January 2017**

Changes from last version of this guidance

New Country Guidance caselaw (FA Libya), which is reflected in our guidance section.

Revised and updated country of origin information

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